KGB Archives for Media

Handbook

Kyiv 2018
Today, access to the KGB archives in Ukraine is open for anyone. This only requires a passport. From any country. You can even submit your application online. This law was passed on 9 April 2015.

It took place 24 years after Ukraine gained independence. It took our team 10 years to accomplish. And although Ukraine was not the first country to do this in the post-Soviet space, our legislation is the one of the most liberal in Europe. Even the Baltic States admire the openness of access to the Soviet intelligence services documents.

How did this happen in Ukraine?

We showed the need for archival reforms for ordinary people and made it one of the prerequisites of the country’s political transformation. Archival reform also became a part of the media reform with its struggles against censorship and free access to information.

But we started this work with a crash of illusions. The changes were unnecessary not only for archivists (as expected), but also to a large extent to historians. Why? For various reasons: those who already had access through personal connections or “gifts” were satisfied with the exclusivity.
Some wanted to wait furtively for the changes to occur in order not to annoy the archival directors, but others simply did not want to waste time.

The volume of the secret archives of the KGB in Ukraine could be described as an imaginary 9 storey building. Nine floors, densely packed with evidence of an entire era — and this does not need a specialist? Unfortunately, that was the case. We made a mistake in the target audience.

The opening of the archives in Ukraine was very worrying to Russia, which dumped approved information to the audience as political manipulation. Protest over this is not enough to counter propaganda — objective arguments are.

This was one of the goals of our NGO, the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement, when it was created in 2002. The initiators intended to research and narrate the history of Ukraine, primarily the armed resistance to the Nazis and Soviets during and after the Second World War. A professional approach needed the access to more reliable sources than memoirs recorded 60 years after the events took place. At that time, the idea that there were practically no documents about the UPA underground prevailed. Time to time, opponents unveiled testimonies about their “crimes”, and time to time there were documents found among their collectors: either ripped out of the archives or excavated from an underground insurgent bunkers. The attitude of Ukrainians toward the liberation movement and the communist regime was shaped by ignorance. Our ambitious goal to learn and spread facts was impossible without access to archives.

Precedents of access of this type in the post-Soviet space were set by the Baltic States. And their experiences only added optimism. The experiences of other countries in East-
ern Europe were also useful in practical terms. The Polish, Slovak and Czech archives were a powerful source. Access was necessary to the Ukrainian ones.

In 2005, after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine made a democratic change. But these “better times” were postponed in the humanitarian sphere. Despite the creation of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, and large-scale research into the Holodomor, access to the KGB documents remained limited.

In 2007, the then director of the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement, Volodymyr Viatrovych, angered by yet another archival rejection, gave an interview to the influential “Lvivska Gazeta”, which published an article entitled “Ukraine still Preserves the Secrets of a Non-Existent State.” In response to this article, the Head of the SBU invited Viatrovych to a meeting and suggested that he solve the problem himself.

The development of the necessary policies to start the declassification process lasted a year. It was impossible to adopt the appropriate law in the circumstance of political uncertainty, so other means to open access to the archives were found. Since January 2009, the KGB documents in the SBU Archives have been available to people. The interest of academics increased, however, not significantly. Instead, thousands and thousands of people were primarily cautious, and then more and more began to seek the archives for information about their relatives. The information that was opened up in these incomplete two years of access showed the scale of secrets that are an interest not only to scholars but also to ordinary people.

And the media.
It turned out that our history was not boring, and the available archival documents, contained living secrets. What is behind these pieces of paper and fierce pain, and absolute absurdity. The KGB did not only put the “SECRET” stamp on the confiscated photos of UPA insurgents, but also on jazz posters or rock-n-roll posters.

Despite screams from Russia, a civil disaster did not happen: people were interested in the fate of their loved ones, and not for a thirst of revenge.

The issue of access to the KGB documents was of great importance for Russia, as evidenced by the fact that the second decree of the newly elected President Viktor Yanukovych on the SBU was to the dismissal of the archive director. The first was the appointment of a new head of the special services. Valeriy Khoroshkovskyi immediately responded: “The truth that was to be communicated to the Ukrainian people has already been reported” and the “concern of the special services, above all, is to protect their secrets.”

Documents of the deceased KGB were once again secret.

In support of these words, the SBU initiated the prosecution of historian Ruslan Zabily for...disclosure of state secrets: for working on documents about the Holodomor and the UPA. In 2010, Zabily headed the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement and led the newly created museum in the former Gestapo and NKVD-KGB prison in Lviv: “Łacki Street Prison”.

Three years of deprivation of liberty was threatened not only against him, but also against historians in general.

The SBU could achieve this...

And we received another lesson: historical archives should not remain in the hands of the special services. Never.
And not only for reasons of sustainable access, but that “and lead us not into temptation” by the simple forced decisions using the Yezhov method.

This persecution gave a boost to the large-scale civil campaign for the right for the truth: for the access to information from the archives, for the possibility to know about the history of their country for everyone.

The campaign was consonant with the journalistic movement “Stop Censorship!” , which defended freedom of speech, fought against editorial pressure, the criminalization of defamation and access to information on state expenditures.

The special services squeezed everything out of their arsenal: searches, interrogations of all employees of the CDVR and the Museum, confiscation of private computers, attempts to close the Museum, transferring the ownership of the premises of the former KGB prison into the hands of the SBU.

Finally, the historians won a public dispute with the special services. Thanks to the media attention the issue, whether the KGB testimony on the Holodomor and the UPA documents confiscated by the Chekists are a Ukrainian state secret, was published on the front pages of magazines and discussed on the TV during prime time. Even those loyal to the authorities supported historians due to the absurdity of the accusations.

It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian “Stop Censorship” movement for freedom of speech began in 2010 after the removal of a film about the Holodomor from one of the most rated TV channels. Journalist Myroslav Otkovych quit and called upon others for help. Numerous other cases of cen-
sorship were revealed. They concerned corruption and those who were in power and — even history.

The price of gas in the 2000’s and the tools of genocide in the 1930’s. This was Russia’s demand from Ukraine: pay a lot and remember little. This was the minimum of actual topics that created an information coalition of historians and journalists, to defend freedom of speech and access to information.

Finally, the security forces took a pause in regards to their efforts against historians, especially in light of tremendous international pressure. But the sword of Damocles of criminal punishment had been still hanging in the air, until the case was finally closed quietly during Euromaidan.

The problem should have been solved in a comprehensive way.

The CDVR team had already a clear idea not only of the purpose, but also about the practical challenges of a free access organization. We believed that once again a window of opportunity is open and we cannot afford to lose time in developing changes “on the march”.

The program “Open Archives” began in 2011 and provided educational, analytical and advocacy work. We talked about access opportunities, learned from foreign experiences and developed architecture of reform. We drafted a “shelved” law, despite skepticism from others on our prospects. We found devoted partners and motivated professionals.

After the Euromaidan, the question of access to the archives of the repressive authorities of the USSR was placed as a priority in the parliamentary coalition and the new government. The Institute of National Remembrance’s bill was approved by the Government and passed through the Par-
liament as a law. On the 9th April 2015, it was voted upon in the decommunization package and on 21st May, the act came into force.

From now on, everyone could learn about KGB secrets. They were declassified without paying for access: the archives in Ukraine have no right to charge for copies made via phones or cameras. None of the former Chekists can restrict information about themselves.

Was it a success? At this moment, one key point of the reform — the creation of a civilian archive of the Institute of National Remembrance — in which documents from the special security forces will be moved to, has yet to be implemented. This step will guarantee sustainable access, irrespective of the political situation, and deprive law-enforcers and special service units of their influence over history.

Therefore, advocacy for reform is ongoing. And in order to consolidate the existing results, CDVR, the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and our partners, the National Museum “Łącki Street Prison” and the Revolution of Dignity Museum in particular, increase their collaboration with media. The “Deconstruction” project, within which this handbook was brought out, — is a vivid example of such interaction.

That what has been made public, can no longer be hidden. You cannot manipulate what is already known.

Ten years ago, we began with the fact that archival reform was needed for our own professional interests.

But the ultimate goal does not change: the human rights. Everyone should have the opportunity to freely get acquainted with their family and country’s past. Each victim should be able to speak openly about his/her history. Even
with distorted interrogation protocols or a cursory note in the margins of a Chekist paper.

This mission is impossible without access to the archives. But it is also impossible without the work of historians and journalists, publishers and editors, writers and human-rights activists. Without those of us how have a vocation to examine the past.

Each year, interest in the Ukrainian archives increases by 50%. The country has received an additional tool in confronting the hybrid aggression of Russia. Ukraine gives foreign historians and the media the opportunity to learn actual facts about the Soviet past: we have copies of the majority of All-Union KGB instructions and orders.

Thus, decommunization can not only deprive the Ukrainian public space of the symbols of propaganda of the totalitarian regime but also provide information about its mechanisms and essence.

We are certain that these crimes will not be repeated if they are known to the world. And we did our best to make this information accessible to everyone.

We invite you all to the Ukrainian archives.

Yaryna Yasynevych,
Program Director of the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement, consultant for the Historical Documentation Series of the “Book Club “Family Leisure Club” Publishing House

www.facebook.com/yaryna.yasynevych
before going to the archive
Andriy Kohut
Director of the Branch State Archive of Security Service of Ukraine
www.facebook.com/andriy.kohut
How and where to start the archival search

A journalist can find materials for interesting topics and stories in every archive. In order to have a successful first visit, one should prepare in advance. Only after having understood the principles of archival work, structure of archival institutions, ways to access the file, one can expect his/her search will be successful.

Steps of Successful Search

The question “What do you have that is interesting?” is usually the first question asked by reporters. This question makes an archivist feel embarrassed. Why? Everything in the archives is interesting to an archivist. Thus, you may risk getting an unsatisfactory answer or being dismissed. But you may definitely be surprised at what is so interesting here! For example, the document about the facts of the USSR’s attack on Poland and its division into an alliance with Nazi Germany and how the Polish troops carried out the resistance to the Red Army would certainly intrigue you. On the other hand, an archivist will unlikely be surprised.

Before visiting an archive, it is first worth collecting the most possible information about the search subject from
publicly available resources. This will help you determine what specifically you would like to find in the archives and where exactly search for it.

**Preparatory Stage**

- Ask your relatives and friends, ethnographers and contemporaries
- Search in newspapers, journals, and libraries
- Search in e-archives and online database

During this stage the basic facts about a person, event or specific journalistic media project are found. One also gets an overall understanding about related historical periods related to the required material, and questions that need to be answered through the archival search are formulated.

Last, first, and patronymic names and place of birth are the basic data, without which a personalized search cannot be done (in case you need to research a person).

In a search, all possible variations of first and last names must be entered: the spellings could differ because of various transliterations during a person’s life; particularly after the collapse of empires, changes in countries’ borders and occupational forces, etc. So, if you know exactly how the person was registered in Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, Russian, German, or other languages, you should submit all the data available, since it can help during the archival search.

In order to identify a person it is important to know his/her date of birth. Identical first, last and patronymic names in different people can happen quite often. That is why birth date plays a crucial role in successful archival searches. If in doubt about the birth date, but still the place of burial is known, that place must be visited. An inscription on
the gravestone, if it exists, will most likely have the date of birth on it.

**The Place of Birth** is one more valuable factor in identification. Nevertheless, some difficulties can occur here as well. Not all settlements exist to this day: they might have been destroyed, abandoned, or amalgamated into cities. The practice of renaming was quite widespread. The latest example of this is the recent de-communization when some 987 settlements were renamed. Not all were given their historical names. Here and there local communities chose totally new ones.

As with the multiple versions of spelling of names, the most complete information about the names of villages and towns should be given. It can be of use during archival searches.

**The Place of Residence** at the time of arrest, detention, or repressions are worth taking into account. As a rule, archival and criminal files and other documents of repressive regimes are kept at the place of their enactment / creation or returning of a verdict.

It is important to remember that during the twentieth century administrative-territorial system in Ukraine had been changed multiple times. If the settlement where your hero lived or events of your story took place had its administrative affiliation changed, then you should approach the archives of all the regions to which this settlement could have belonged.

Most of aforementioned information can be usually found in the internet. The best examples are those that deal with famous personalities and key events. If a case is less known, then one should be looking at more informational resources.
Local newspapers and magazines from the relevant period are important. Some publications are already digitalized and can be found online. If not, visit local libraries. Sometimes museums and memorial institutions have such publications in their collections. Besides, they can have documents, pictures and personal belongings of heroes of your media projects.

When preparing for an archival visit, one should consult with librarians, museum and memorial personnel, academic, educational and scientific institutions and organizations, ethnographers.

Important **LOCAL RESOURCES OF INFORMATION** are:

- Newspapers and magazines
- Libraries
- Academic and educational institutions, scientific organizations
- Museums and memorial institutions
- Monuments, memorial plaques, inscriptions on graves
- Ethnographers and old-timers.

Obviously, the most important is contact with the person’s relatives before you start searching about him/her in the archives. They, as well as ethnographers, neighbours or even contemporaries can relate local and family lore. Preparatory interviews with them will give you the necessary information for further archival research and will help inform you about the historical circumstances in which your character lived; you may get to know about events related to him/her.

Ask relatives, friends and acquaintances about:

- Last, first and patronymic names of the chosen person,
- Date of birth (day, month and year),
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➤ Place of birth (village or town, district, region, country),
➤ The twist of fate.

It is recommended to start your search on the internet. Due to the technical development of online data and digital archives most of your search can be done only by computer.

Online Database

“Rehabilitated by History”:
➤ “The National Bank of the Data of Victims of Political Repressions of the Soviet Era in Ukraine” the period of 1920–1990 is over 200,000 people
➤ Printed publications about repressed persons in the context of each region (oblast)
➤ Scientific-documentary magazine “From the Archives of the VUCHK-GPU-NKVD-KGB”
www.reabit.org.ua

Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance:
➤ National and regional volumes of the Book in Memory of the Holodomor Victims of 1932–1933 in Ukraine (available in an electronic form)
➤ Geographic Information System “Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine” (http://194.44.11.188/)
www.memory.gov.ua

Archives of the Institute of Church History of the Ukrainian Catholic University:
➤ database of priests before and after 1945;
➤ over 2000 interviews, 100 video interviews, over 5000 photos, and 5000 documents.
http://ichistory.org.ua
RUSSIAN DATABASES OF VICTIMS OF POLITICAL REPRESSIONS:

   www.lists.memo.ru
➤ “Stalin Lists”, 1936–1938:
   www.stalin.memo.ru
➤ “Open List”. Victims of political repressions of 1917–1991
   https://ru.openlist.wiki
➤ “Immortal Barracks”: the names and stories of prisoners of Gulag
   https://bessmertnybarak.ru

DATABASES ON THE SECOND WORLD WAR:

➤ “Saxon Memorials in Memory of the Victims of Political Terror”
   www.dokst.ru
➤ Russian generalized data bank “Memorial”, 1941–1945
   www.obd-memorial.ru
➤ Russian electronic bank of documents “Heroic Deeds of the People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945”
   http://podvignaroda.ru
➤ Polish program “Personnel Losses and Victims of Repressions Under the German Occupation”, 1939–1945
   www.straty.pl

E-Archives

ELECTRONIC ARCHIVES OF THE UKRAINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT:

➤ Documents and collections from Security Service of Ukraine Branch State Archives
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- Archive of the Center for the Research on the Liberation Movement
- Thematic collections
  
  http://avr.org.ua

**Ukrainian Periodicals On-line Archive:**

- Interwar periodicals of Galicia, Volhynia and Bukovyna
- Occupation publications of the Second World War period
- Periodicals published in DP camps
  
  https://libraria.ua

**Web resources about the Holodomor:**

- Holodomor Victims Memorial (testimonies, archival documents)
  
  http://memorialholodomor.org.ua
- Page with archival editions
  
  http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/
- “In Memory of the Holodomor”
  
  www.memory.gov.ua/page/pamyat-pro-golodomor-1932–1933

**Resources about the Holocaust:**

- Yad Vashem’s collections
  
  www.yadvashem.org/collections.html
- Catalog of the Holocaust Museum in Washington
  
  https://collections.ushmm.org/search/

**Archival websites and European search services:**

- Polish search services “Szukaj w Archiwach”
  
  http://szukajwarchiwach.pl
- Archives of Polish IPN
  
Andrij Kohut

- National Digital Archives of Poland
  www.audiovis.nac.gov.pl
- Czech Search Services
  www.badatelna.cz
- Archives of the Czechoslovak Communist Special Services StB
  www.absr.cz/cs/vyhledavani-archivni-pomucky
- Documents of the Soviet Epoch
  http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru

ARCHIVAL PROJECTS OR WEB SITES WITH ARCHIVAL DATA:
- International project “Memory of the People”
  www.pametnaroda.cz
- Open Society Archives
  www.osaarchivum.org
- Media Library of the German Communist Special Services Stasi Mediathek
  www.stasi-mediathek.de
- KGB documents website created by the Baltic countries
  www.kgbdocuments.eu
- Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System Online
  http://hcl.harvard.edu/collections/hpsss/index.html
- Karta Centre
  http://karta.org.pl
- “Chernobyl Historical Workshop”
  http://1986.org.ua

Requests to the Archives

Once the basic information has been collected, date and place of birth of the character of the story of journalistic material or the circumstances of one or another event are es-
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tablished, one can proceed to the next stage — access to the archives.

One can write a letter to the archives requesting an access to archival materials of certain persons, events, etc., for acquaintance, even though one might not have the relevant information that is needed about the exact place where the documents are based. In order to receive a quick and positive confirmation, please include in your letter where exactly the requested information can be stored, i.e. in which fonds or collections.

You can find these facts in scientific articles and monographs, or archival descriptions of fonds, annotated indexes and directories.

The law requires that such reference information is provided on the website of each archival institution. Hence, before sending your request, one should get acquainted with it.

On the archival site you can find the following useful information not only during the preparation of your request itself but later on during your work in the reading room:

- directories and guides of the archives
- descriptions of fonds and collections
- rules of the reading room
- cost of paid services and conditions for their provision
- working days and working hours of the reading room
- contact details

If you address archives with the purpose to familiarise yourself with documents that have already been mentioned in scientific literature, you then learn the archived legend there. In this case the archivist will know exactly what specific materials you will be working with. One of the largest libraries of electronic copies of publications on history can
be found on the website of the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine: http://history.org.ua.

According to the setting of Ukrainian archives, the archived legend must include abbreviation (name) of the archive, numbers of the fonds, description, file, and sometimes the number of the volume. For example: ГДА СБУ (Branch State Archives of the Security Service of Ukraine). — Ф (fonds). 13. — Оп (list). 1. — Спр (file). 376. — Т (volume). 1.

If you do not have a specific archival legend, then it is worth to search the archive’s website for any possible background information.

First, one should find out what kind of fonds are needed. As a rule, the fonds name is formulated according to the fonds-founder (organization, institution, department, and author or document collector) and based on the content of documents in order to reflect the nature of the information as much as possible. Also, the list for fonds, descriptions and files includes their deadline dates. These facts help with orientation of the chronological range of included documents.

A fonds can contain from one to several lists. Each description can have thousands of files. Fonds, lists and lists of files are placed differently in various archival websites. Do not be discouraged in file you were not able to find the information right away.

Directories and guides of the archives contain much wider range of information (usually annotated one) about archived fonds and their structural units. Apart from quantity of units where files are stored, there is a short description of exact documents to be found there. As a rule, such pub-
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Publications are available in a pdf format or in the sections of “Publications” or “Helpdesk”.

For example, the guidebook of the Branch State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine describes lists, number of storing units (files and volumes); listed are the units of repressive bodies, which became the founders of certain fonds.

When researching within archives with stored documents of communist intelligent services of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, one should start with the guidebook through the archival network “Documents of Communist Intelligence Services in Europe”. It provides the information about the archives of former communist special service agencies of Bulgaria, Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. There is the description of legislative framework, the organizational structures of the relevant archives, archival fonds and collections including the most secret operating documents. The description of the rights of applicants to access and distribute these materials is provided.

In case if information is not available, one can always try searching articles or reviews with the information about certain archives. It often occurs that even though information of the Soviet Intelligent Services was commonly recorded in Russian, modern lists and guidelines are formed by national languages of the countries and are kept in the archives of republican departments of the KGB (e.g., in Georgia or Moldova). International collections and descriptions are useful in these cases. E.g., analytical report “Open Access to the KGB Archives: Ukrainian Experience for the Eastern Partnership Countries”. Information about fonds of the communist in-
intelligence services in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has been collected there. It also states non-governmental organizations that are processing these archives or trying to provide access to them.

Link to useful information:

- Center for Research on the Liberation Movement: [www.cdvr.org.ua/dostup](http://www.cdvr.org.ua/dostup)

Public, academic and human rights organizations may have publications and additions about the archives of communist intelligence services as well. They are helpful in finding contacts of experts and researchers who are involved in this topic.

If it is not possible to find directories, indexes or online lists of fonds, you will be provided with such for your information during your visit to the archive, in the reading room.

Requests to the archives are recommended to be written before your visit; plan your visit after you have received a response to your letter. Sample requests are usually posted on web sites of the archives.
In case you are not sure which archives can have necessary testimonies, then write to several. This will save you time; you will get the wide ranged information and find specific archives with necessary documents.

**Whom to Address?**

**Repressed:**
- ГДА СБУ (Branch State Archives of the State Security Services of Ukraine) — political repressions
- ГДА МВС (Branch State Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) — administrative repressions (eviction, deportation)
- ЦДАГО (Central State Archives of Public Associations) — political repressions (files of rehabilitated persons)
- State regional archives — political repressions and filtration files:
  - As per the requested person’s place of birth
  - As per place of residency
  - As per arrests
  - As per place where the punishment is served
- ГІАЦ МВС РФ (Main Information and Analytical Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation) — information about the persons who served their sentence or were re-sentenced on the territory of the Russian Federation.

**Second World War:**
- Regional archives (by place of birth and / or military call on service)
- ЦДАГО (Central State Archives of Public Associations) —
about persons who fought in the Ukrainian Staff of the Partisan Movement

- ЦДАВО (Central State Archives of Higher Authorities and Management) — with the information about Soviet prisoners of war
- military commissions — at the place of appeal
- The search services “Red Cross Society of Ukraine”
- РГВА (Russian State Military Archives) — before 1940 inclusive,
- ЦАМО РФ (Central Archives of the Ministry of Defence of Russian Federation) — after 1941 inclusive
- ЦВМА МО РФ (Central Military Navy Archives of the Ministry of Defense) — those who served in the Navy

Letters of request to the archives can be sent by e-mail as well as by regular mail. A response should be received no later than in a month with additional time for post delivery. Lately, the archives communicate through email more often. Nevertheless, letter correspondence should be considered as an option.

If archival information is needed in less than a month, it should be mentioned in the request. As a rule, archives try to meet the needs of reporters/journalists.

It is advisable to specify if you plan to work on the archival site periodically, e.g. throughout the year. In this case you need to mention what topic you would work on. This will allow saving you time and you will not need to write a request to the archives each time further on.

When searching for information, archivists follow the Law of Ukraine “On Applying of Citizens” if a case is related to archived fonds with the following documents:
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➤ about destinies of people including those repressed
➤ about the facts on history of settlements
➤ about historical events
➤ about activities of various organizations and institutions

Hence, any retrospective information would fall under this category.

If a reporter/journalist is interested in the archived materials and activity of a facility in particular, then his/her request will be considered under the Law of Ukraine “On Access to Public Information”. In this case the archival institution is obligated to provide a response within five working days.

The following topics are included in particular:
➤ regulations of the archives
➤ regulations of operational rules and regulations of the reading rooms
➤ staff designation
➤ designation of functions and duties of management
➤ working hours.

According to Article 5 of the Law “On Applying of Citizens”, one can address the archive in the following ways:
➤ in person (proposed by a citizen and recorded by an official staff member at the personal appointment)
➤ in writing
➤ by mail
➤ by email
➤ through a designated person

A written request (hard copies or e-mail) is the most commonly used. The benefit of it is that in case of refuse in response to a letter of inquiry, the reason must be provided.
You must mention in your request (pg. 5):

- name and address of an archival institution
- last, first and patronymic names of an applicant
- place of residency of an applicant
- explanation of what kind of information is being requested
- date
- signature

When sending a request by e-mail instead of the graphical signature, it is enough to write first and last names of an applicant.

If you plan to do video recording inside the archival facility, make sure you specify this in your request. Also, information on all the video recording crew, as well as a list of equipment to be carried into the facility must be provided in this letter (e.g., camera, microphone, light, etc.). It is recommended to address an archive in advance in such situations, preferably in a month.

Useful hints: if you are not a freelancer, a request should be submitted using an editorial office form.

Time frames of reviewing of requests (pg. 20):

- within 5 days — a response sent out immediately if the requested material is available (no longer that 15 days), if no additional search is needed
- within 1 month — an official response
- within 45 days — in certain cases if additional search is needed (an applicant must be informed about it).

If the required information is stored in other archival location than being addressed to, the archivists must forward the request as per designated location. An applicant still receives the notification from the archive that the request has
been forwarded to another institution with the exact name of the institution.

When sending a request to the archive in advance, it is guaranteed that at the time of your visit the archival facility personnel would have sufficient time to prepare necessary files, book pass(es) and make sure audio or video recording arrangements within the archival facility have been confirmed.

At the times of anniversaries, jubilees, and memorial dates this approach may secure your visit reservation in case there might be other requests by another team of reporters for the same date and time. Things like this happen.

The most optimal timing to follow is to request about a visit to the archive a month in advance. If you are unable to plan accordingly, then at least a week is sufficient.

**Using Archives**

You can come to the archive without pre-booking but you will still have to submit a request on the spot. You will be permitted to work in the reading room only the next day.

The pass band system operates in most archives. For this reason one must get a pass first. A document certifying a person has to be presented. The recommended type of document is a passport or driver’s licence.

Every archive has approved rules of work in the reading room. The rules explain in detail what exactly a visitor can do and in what sequence. It is worth getting to know these rules (posted on websites of most institutions) before one’s visit to an archive in order to understand the nature of archivists’ work.
When in the reading room, one should first fill a visitor’s application. You will be instructed on the work rules of the reading room as well as on the legal responsibilities while working within the archival facility.

Before starting to work with archival documents a visitor must be notified about his/her full responsibility for sharing the content of the information of repressive organs. Possible legal consequences of publicly presented information are explained. You are then considered to be informed about the responsibility once you have started working with files. Hence, the documents you received from the staff of the reading room must be read thoroughly.

Documents you will have an opportunity to work with are an integral part of the National Archival Fonds as part of cultural heritage of Ukraine. You should be very careful and attentive when researching files. You are not permitted to take documents outside the reading room or pass them to another individual.

It is strictly prohibited to make notes in archival documents or write on sheets of paper located on top of archival files.

Copies of archival documents made by using your own technical means (cameras or smart phones, cell phone scanners) can be made only with flash off. An option of creating imitating sound should be off as well. To make copies is prohibited if a document had potential to be damaged by doing so.

If high quality copies of materials are needed, one can request such services from employees of the archive. There is a charge for this service. One should clarify the cost, parameters and time of making a copy.
If an archive has a copy of the document (digital or on microfiche), one will receive it for being familiarized with it. An access to the original documents can be denied if:

- documents are unique (provided only in exceptional cases upon the written approval of a head of the archive and if backup copies are available)
- documents are in an unsatisfactory condition
- documents that have not passed scientific and technical processing or are in the process of it
- documents are under review of their availability and condition, being under restoration or other type of work, are stored in the facilities currently under construction, or in case of moving massive amount of documents to new locations as well as in emergency or extraordinary situations
- documents that contain information with limited access

Please remember: very rarely archives have practice to offer access to files right after they were requested. This is related to the specifics of an archival file. Before being provided to you in the reading room or delivered to the room, each and every file is being checked in the fonds storage by the employee. These files are checked for possible damage, any missing sheets, etc. Apart from it, getting stored fonds is done only after the management of the archive has approved it. The employees appreciate your understanding and patience while they fulfil their duties as per requirements of the legislation.

Every archived file contains so-called the ‘sheet of usage’ where everyone who works with a certain file must indicate the date, write his/her last and first names, the purpose of requesting a document, and sign the sheet.
According to the work rules and regulations of most of reading rooms, **UP TO 10 FILES PER DAY CAN BE ORDERED** (in some cases there are restrictions of up to 1000 sheets).

A visitor may lose the right to work in a reading room for violation of the rules of reading rooms.

As a rule, description of fonds, guides and reference materials in the reading room is accessible to everyone. Employees of the archive try to compile materials according to themes and specifics of facilities of their current work.

If you were able to identify fonds and files which you need to review before coming to the archive, then you can definitely start your first day in the reading room working with available archived files.

Ukrainian archives keep all documents in file volumes with mandatory certified records at the back of the last sheet. This guarantees that the content of the file has not been changed. In case there were changes in a document list, records would have notes on when the changes applied and what exactly was altered.

For example, when working with a file you notice that some sheets are numbered. It means this file has been reformatted, i.e. it has some documents removed or added.

At the beginning of the file, a list of documents is attached with the list of additional sheets corresponding to the file. Every sheet is numbered. Numbers are put only on the first page of a sheet. As a rule, the back side of the sheet has no number. When booking (e.g., to make copies), you need to indicate the back page of the certain sheet. In this case you need to add the abbreviation “зв.” to the page number (“зв.” meaning ‘back side of the sheet’). An average file contains approximately 250 sheets. The size of files can vary, though.
Work rules and regulations of the reading room state terms during which the reserved files are on hold for your review. If you, for instance, have not claimed requested files for two months, they will be returned to their original archived storage location. A new application must be filed with request to access these files; an applicant then waits for the files to be provided.

When working in the reading room, do not forget that archives have two extra important tasks: preserve national archival heritage and provide access to it.

**The System of Archival Institutions**

**The State Archival Services of Ukraine** ([http://www.archives.gov.ua](http://www.archives.gov.ua)) is the central executive body responsible for realization of the government policy for archival functioning. In other words, this is the institution that manages, coordinates and supports methods of work of all archival institutions in Ukraine.

Central state archives are under direct supervision of the State Archival Services of Ukraine. Among them are the two historical ones which are located in Kyiv and Lviv. These archives store the most massive amount of historical documents.

**Central State Archives of Ukraine:**

- Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine (ЦДАГО)
- Central State Archives of the Supreme Bodies of Power and Administration of Ukraine (ЦДАВО)
- Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, city of Kyiv (ЦДІАК)
Andrij Kohut

- Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, city of Lviv (ЦДІАЛ)
- Н. Pshenychnyi Central State Cinema and Photographic Archives of Ukraine
- Central State Cinema and Photographic Archives of Ukraine (ЦДАМЛМ)
- Central State Archive of Foreign Ukrainian Studies (ЦДАЗУ)

The Central State Archive of Public Associations (ЦДАГО) was established in 1991 and is based on the former archived materials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (http://cdago.gov.ua). It contains not only materials on fonds of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, but also lists the fonds of Soviet partisan formations that were active on the territory of Ukraine during World War II, and documents of political parties for the period from early twentieth century till present. The Central State Archive of Public Associations stores the volumes of criminal files of rehabilitated persons. These materials have been transferred to the Archives of Security Service of Ukraine at the beginning of 1990’s. This is how the of Wilhelm von Habsburgs’ file was transferred. He was known under a different name Vasyl Vyshyvanyj, Colonel of the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, and was an unofficial candidate for the Ukrainian throne.

The Central State Archive of Higher Authorities (ЦДАВО) (http://tsdavo.gov.ua) stores the documents of activities of most powerful structures that existed on the territory in Ukraine during the twentieth century. This is where you can work with the documents of ministries and departments of the era of Ukrainian statehood of 1917–1920. The fonds of
How and where to start the archival search

so called “Prague Archive” were brought to Kyiv after World War II when the Red Army took over the capital of Czechoslovakia. These fonds have important testimonies about Ukrainian immigration during the post-war period.

**Local State Archival Institutions**

State archival institutions function in every region. As a rule, they store documents of the National Archival Fonds tangent to local history. Every institution is a structural subdivision of the local regional state administration subordinated to its head and controlled by the Ukrainian State Archive.

Regional state archives store documents not only for the period of the twentieth century but also during much earlier periods, depending on the region. Some volumes of archival and criminal files on rehabilitated persons and filtration files from local departments of Security Services of Ukraine (not including Poltavska region) were transferred to these institutions in early 1990’s.

27 State Archives of Regions and State Archives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol: 1,5 million of archival and criminal files with documents of punitive and repressive regime of corresponding territories in the USSR and Ukrainian SSR, including 1 million 373 thousand of so-called filtration files on persons who were in German captivity, 169 thousand of criminal files on rehabilitated persons.

**Sectoral State Archives**

Sectoral state archives have been established and functioning within the framework of certain authorities such as Security Services of Ukraine, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defence or Foreign Intelligence Services. They are
under direct subordination and leadership of their framework bodies and coordinated by the Ukrainian State Archive.

- Branch State Archive of the Ministry of the Interior Affairs of Ukraine (ГДА МВС)
- Branch State Archive of the Foreign Intelligence Services of Ukraine (ГДА СЗР)
- Branch State Archive of the Security Services of Ukraine (ГДА СБУ)

Specifically, this type of archives keeps the documents of corresponding former Soviet authorities stored. Nowadays these archives must work according to the Law of Ukraine “On Access to the Archives of the Repressive Organs of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of 1917–1991” and provide free access to its fonds.

**Archives of NGO**

Historical documents can also be stored in archives of different NGO, publishing houses and private collections. For example:

- Archive of the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement
- Museum-archive and Documentation Center of the Ukrainian Samvydav of the Smoloskyp Publishing House
- Museum-archive of Press and Samvydav
how to read kgb documents
Volodymyr Birchak

Head of Academic Programs of the Center for Research on the Liberation Movement, Deputy Director of the Branch State Archive of Security Service of Ukraine (2014–2016)

www.facebook.com/volodymyrbirchak
One should be prepared for a variety of files that will be issued to the reader before going to the archive of the former communist special services.

Each type of archival file contains documents with information of varying degrees of certainty. The archival-investigative (criminal), agent, personal, lettered and log-files are only a part of what was produced by the communist security services. There are different types of documents stored in different files: interrogation protocols, arrest warrants, various questionnaires, conclusions, reports, instructions, commands, orders, agent reports, etc.

Paper work of the communist secret services also changed from time to time. Therefore, there were changes to the types of files and their content. The information which one can find in some documents, as well as the ability to determine the probable level their reliability, will make a journalistic search of the archives much more efficient and effective.

The following four parts of this guide should help orient someone to the types of archival files available as well as the information that may be contained in each. The list of terminology decodes and explains the terminology used by the Cheka in their documentation.

The archival-investigative files are one of the largest fonds in the archives. In fact, investigative material against
one or more groups or people may have many volumes. Such files are also interesting because they could have preserved material evidence: photos, personal documents, newspapers, books and even private belongings.

**The agent files**, perhaps, will be the most interesting since film, fiction and the media have created a halo of mystery around agents and intelligence work. Examples of agent files and archival document which are stored in them are explained in the appropriate part of this guide.

**Operational files** are also extremely interesting, because the Cheka collected materials based on their operational work: development, surveillance, search or a fight against various “enemy elements” and spyware. Information supplied by agents, materials of perlustration of correspondence, eavesdropping decoding records, operational information, correspondence, trophy materials — this is a very incomplete list of documents that can be found in such files.

**Other documents** are a diverse stratum of files: from books to guides which were issued by the KGB to their employees, to materials of department documentations and those from the secretariat of the communist special services. In the latter case, for example, there are collections of reports and informational accounts which contain summaries of important events in the Soviet Ukraine and around the world which was submitted by the KGB to the Central Committee in Kyiv and Moscow.

When describing each of these files, its mandatory components are included along with examples.
The archival-investigative files (AIF) of repressive agencies are valuable and are often requested by historians and journalists. Often, these are criminal files. However, most people convicted by the communist regime were not criminals and the investigations against them were fabricated, therefore the term “archival-investigative files” is more accurate.

These documents reflect the mechanisms of the repressive totalitarian machine, give an opportunity to comprehend the causes and extent of mass terror, trace the intensity of political repressions during specific historical periods and the pressure placed on the social, ethnic, political or confessional strata of society.

Not all of the AIFs are stored in the archival system of the SSU. Since September 1991, some of these materials have been deposited in regional state archives, and in Kyiv — to the Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine (TsDAHO). Primarily, we are dealing with AIFs for individuals with sentences passed by...
extra-judicial agencies — “dvoika” (dyad), “troika” (triad), special council.

In the SSU archival system, the AIFs are included in “political” files: convicted for treason, terrorism, anti-Soviet agitation, espionage, etc. A small number — for economic abuses, illegal currency transactions, smuggling, etc.

A separate group consists of files that were of a political nature, but were individual convictions, under the criminal statutes (theft, storage of weapons, etc.). These AIFs are stored in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the regional archives of the National Police Department.

The AIFs in the SSU system cover the entire period of the existence of Soviet repressive agencies — from 1917 to 1991. The majority of files occurred during the 1930–1950s wave of repressions.

The AIFs reveal little-known and completely unknown biographical facts about many people in the educational, cultural, artistic, religious fields and often cover the fate of their intellectual heritage or fixate on the last days of their lives.

The largest fonds in the SSU archival system are the “Suspended” (rehabilitated files) and “Basic” (Not Rehabilitated) files. The dates of the documents here are from 1854 to the 2000s. The investigative proceedings concern persons
or groups of people who were convicted mainly for political motives and reflect a specific repression:

- against the military, politicians and activists of the UNR (Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), as well as members of political parties (socialist revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists and others), any opposing the Bolsheviks, Denikin and Wrangel’s armies and former employees of the Tsarist police — “Okhranka”;

- against participants of various kinds of uprisings and unrest during the period of forced grain procurement in the late 1920s and early 1930s;

- the period of the “Great Terror” of 1937–1938 (the Polish, German, kulak, Zionist, Czech and other operations), cleansing of the structures of the special services and party, repressions against cultural representatives — “Executed Renaissance.”

- against members of resistance movements: UVO (Ukrainian Military Organization), OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), the Home Army, the POW (Polish Military Organization) and others;

- against members of the Nazi military and paramilitary formations (police, Schutzmannschaft battalions, Abwehr commandos, GFP, SS, SD and others); as well as representatives of the occupation authorities;

- against representatives of the “quiet resistance” — dissidents (poets, writers, artists, etc.)

- against the clergy: Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Russian Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Protestants, Muslims, Jewish, etc.
A separate array of documents cover economic crimes (corruption, theft of state property in large quantities, smuggling, currency transactions, etc.), as well as files of illegally crossing the state border.

Researchers of these documents or journalists must take the following into account before working on them: the AIFs, as none other historical source, contain intentional distortions: the contents of the handwritten and typed variants of the interrogation protocols sometimes vary considerably, the protocols themselves can have different dates, falsified dates, different reasons for the death of the repressed and so on.

It should also be borne in mind that the AIFs of different periods have significant differences. The files of the 1920s, for example, are still rudimentary, with numerous structural violations and there are documents missing which should be obligatory. Between the 1930s and 1940s, this issue was dealt with more thoroughly, although there were still numerous violations. In the 1970s and onward, the investigators followed clear instructions. Therefore, there is the least amount of professional negligence, incompetence, superficial operatives during that period of time.

Documents

Cover of Files

These sources contain initial information about the person, as well as which unit of the repressive agency investigated the case, how many volumes it contains, when the investigation began and when it ended and so on.
The most important information on the cover is the file number. There may be several of them:

- first — procedural (registration) number of the investigation, inscribed by hand, ink stamped or typographic printing (e.g., multi-volume AIF’s No. 123, No. 817 etc.);
- second — number of the archival registration for the “basic” fonds. As a rule, it is multi-valued — from one to six digits. Typically, this number is placed on a special white sticker (e.g.: 63276);
- third — the number of the archival registration in the “Suspended” fonds. Here, the previous issue of the “basic” fonds is crossed out and instead, there is another multi-valued (also from one to six digits) archival number marked with a “fp”; it can be hand written or stamped at the top and bottom (e.g.: 63276-fp).
Today, only a single stamp is used in the archival institutions of the SSU which contains the final archival number of the file, in accordance with the legislative requirements which regulates the registration of documents of the National Archival Fonds. Primarily — DSTU 4331:2004 (ISAD (G): 1999, NEQ).

Examples of stamps used on AIF covers
Detention Protocol

**Detention of a Suspect** — a measure of criminal procedural coercion which could be applied without prosecutorial sanctions. A person, suspected of committing a crime, was deprived of liberty for a short time in order to find out whether the detainee was involved in a crime and to decide whether to extend their detention.

Such protocols were drawn up on the spot. For UPA soldiers, for *Example*, — this was often immediately after being captured in battle or during a so-called Cheka-Military Operation.

It should be noted that the detainee was searched immediately. It is interesting, that some of the things that were seized from them were at times not specified in the protocol when they were already in prison or these things simply disappeared from the investigative material.

These protocols were usually compiled quickly. Most likely — with deliberate violations of the structure and requirements of such documents. For *Example*, the protocol indicated the removal of a watch, but did not indicate its serial number, model, metal base colour. Subsequently, among the evidence such an item could be replaced by another, less valuable one, while the actual item was removed — either to keep or sell. The Chekists often resorted to such abuses.

*Example*. On 22 August 1951, Archimandrite of the Pochayiv Lavra Oleksij was arrested for suspicion of anti-Soviet agitation by the employees of the Ministry of State Security Department in the Ternopil Oblast and imprisoned in the city of Ternopil.
During the course of the investigation, two additional allegations were put forward against him, stemming from his arrest. First — storing narcotic substances: heroine was found in one of the cells sealed by the Archimandrite. Oleksiy explained: a pharmacist, who used this substance as a painkiller, died there recently. So, until they found a new specialist, his cell was sealed with Oleksiy’s stamp. The second additional charge — that Oleksiy kept money from the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which depicted the prohibited Ukrainian coat of arms — the Trident. The explanation that he kept them as a collectible did not help him.

Very often, when a participant of the resistance movement was detained, a description of the weapons also seized can be found, or a schematic plan or even pictures of hideouts (shelters) where they lived. This is also an interesting artifact for researchers.

**Arrest Decree / Resolution on the Selection of a Preventative Measure**

**ARREST** (Latin: *arrestum* — judicial decision) — a measure within the criminal process, the essence of which is: a suspect, accused or defendant who is detained, in order to pre-
vent their possible evasion from investigation and trial, impeding the establishment of the truth in the case or possible criminal activity, as well as to ensure the execution of the sentence.

The arrest decree was formed on the basis of information collected about the person by the repressive agencies. This could be evidence from another arrested person, information obtained during the process of an operational investigation or agent information.

Very often, the charges laid out in the arrest decree were false, the information — inaccurate, incomplete, distorted and at times — completely fictitious. Therefore, it must be verified with the testimony of the arrested as well as with the other people involved in the case/cases, or even witness interrogation reports.

It should be noted, that the Soviet repressive agencies still had to adhere to their own laws in order to perform these tasks, in particular, the Criminal Procedure Code. The materials were mainly prepared by an operational officer, but the document itself should be approved by the head of the regional (or higher) department of the repressive agencies and authorized by the prosecutor. Also, the decree was to have been approved by the direct leadership of the Operational Commissioner. Due to this, the date of signing the document by these certain people sometimes varies with the date of the actual arrest of the suspect (which could have occurred earlier). Already, such discrepancies indicate a violation of the law in these cases.

The date of a person’s detention and the arrest decree may also vary. A person could have been in detention for several months before an official document was issued. This
was usually due to non-compliance of the law during the investigation. At times, the authorities tried to persuade the detainees to cooperate with them, and did not initiate an official investigation.

**Example.** In May 1944, the employees of the NKGB’s (People’s Commissariat for State Security) Derzhnya regional district arrested Abram Shtreiker, an UPA doctor whose nom-de-guerre was “Popper”. The investigation was conducted with all possible violations. The arrest of Dr. “Popper” did not have a warrant issued for it, the arrest and detention decrees were not approved by either the prosecutor nor the head of the regional NKGB.

**Warrant**

**The Arrest Warrant** — a document that allows the arrest and detention of a person, the search and seizure of property. In the Anglo-Saxon system, it is usually issued by a judge on behalf of the state. However, in the Soviet repressive agencies, the order was issued by an operations officer and was to be approved by the head of the regional (or higher) department.
It should be noted, that on the back of the warrant, as a rule, there should have been a signature of the arrested and the date, when he was presented this warrant. Mostly, it coincided with the first day of their imprisonment, unless a person was detained earlier (see sections on detention and arrest).

**Questionnaire of the Arrested**

This document is especially important because it contains basic biographical information about the person: surname, name, patronymic, date and place of birth and residence, education, service in the army, occupation, social status, information about relatives, descriptive appearance, etc.
Samples of Various Types of Questionnaire of Arrested
Often there may be a photo of the arrested and a fingerprint card was in the questionnaire itself (or attached to it). The photographs were made by strictly adhering to the rules of judicial photographing. These photos are valuable because they can often indicate the moral-psychological state of the detainee during his detention.

It should be noted, that the arrested could have knowingly entered another date or place of birth, and also filed a fictitious surname. Investigators, knowing this, immediately tried to “get” the true and exhaustive information from the arrested, quite often — without any results. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the certificates, collected by the repressive agencies after the completion of the investigation, where the information from the questionnaire was checked in various government agencies, metric books, etc.

**Example.** Hryhoriy Drul, nom-de-guerre — “Slavko” — head of the medical department of the UPA Military District “Lysonia”. 2.05.1945 he was captured, sentenced under the name Severyn Danylevych.

**Search Report**

**The search** — an investigative action, the essence of which is a compulsory examination of premises and other places or people. Its purpose — to find and remove tools of the crime, items and valuables, obtained by criminal means, as well as other items and documents of relevance to their case.

If the suspect was arrested in his place of residence, then this was searched as was his place of work, etc. Definite witnesses also had to be present during the search.
Everything that the detainee had with him at the time of his arrest was taken away, as well as items which could be of operational interest of the repressive agencies.

**Example.** On 19 March 1950 — the employees of the MGB (Ministry of State Security) district department conducted a search in the dwelling of Father Manyshovsky, as well as in the church in the village of Korosno and town of Peremysliany, and found “anti-Soviet” literature. In particular: “Dogmatics”, “Ethics”, “Sainted Letters”, “Sermons and Speeches”, “Seven Words of Jesus Christ” and others. The Lviv Regional Office for Literature and Publishing Houses, assessed the books from the priest as “reactionary, those, who preach about Catholicism and the Uniate Church and are to be destroyed.”

A receipt was to be given for any valuables taken during the search (money, jewelry, awards, etc.), and the items themselves were to be deposited in the financial department of the repressive agency. The arrested, in return, were supposed to be given the receipt with everything that was taken from him. Particular attention was paid to drawing up these documents. Such measures were considered preventative — so that the future defendant could not declare any materials that could compromise him during his trial were given to him.

Confiscated items considered “anti-Soviet” by the inves-
tigators (medals with the Trident or other “prohibited symbols”, photographs, documents, etc.) were attached to the case as evidence. At the same time, the employees of the repressive agencies did not simply disregard the material evidence of the “private collectibles” during their search — they simply stole them from the investigative files. Therefore, it was often that one did not find any awards, rings or other jewelry in the file which was seized during the arrest.

Sometimes, the evidence after the investigation and trial did not have any operational value. Then, it was destroyed according to a separate decision or sentence.

The previous Ukrainian legislation on the rehabilitation of victims of political repression included a provision that “rehabilitated persons and their successor were entitled to receive manuscripts, photographs and other personal belongings preserved from their files.” Therefore, some of the personal belongings seized during the arrest may not be in
the AIFs because they were returned to their rightful owners or heirs. But there should be an appropriate mark to distinguish this.

**Record of Personal Property of the Arrested**

During the search, a list of belongings of the arrested during the period of the investigation was conducted. Following this list, there was a “memorandum” which was signed by one of the relatives of the arrested, and if that was not available, one of their neighbours.

The arrested belongings, according to the verdict, could be confiscated by the state.

**Interrogation Report**

**INTERROGATION** — the investigative procedure and judicial action, regulated by procedural law during which the witness, victim, suspect, accused or defendant give their statements. They are recorded in the minutes of the interrogation or trial, and if necessary, in audio or video recordings.

Before the first interrogation, the investigator determined how exactly he will work with the defendants regarding the case materials. In other words — he chooses his tactics for conducting the investigation. The defendants, while in their cells, also chose their own tactics on how to defend themselves. How do you behave during the investigation? What to talk about and what to keep silent about? What does the investigator know or not know?

The interrogation reports, despite all their subjectivity, are a valuable biographical source. Of these, one can learn
more about the facts of the life of the arrested, about certain historical events and processes, trace the course of the investigation, methods of inquiry, and impressions about the contemporary socio-moral atmosphere.

The first interrogation report is largely created by an officer during the arrest or detention of a suspect. This document must contain the most biographical information about the person. This includes answers to the questions from the investigator such as “tell me a short biography of yourself” or “tell me about your criminal activity.”

Each interrogation report was recorded by the operational officer or investigator from the words of the detainees but added terminology of the respective repressive agency. Therefore, the answers of the arrested may include words and turns of phrases which the detainee would not actually say.

Example. The investigator asked about being in the resistance movement: “Tell me about the time you belonged to the UPA gang?” The answer of the detainee: “I joined the UPA gang in March 1943.” Obviously, it was unlikely he would call the UPA a “gang”, this was added by the investigator himself.

Such insertions by the investigator or officer form their own language within the AIF. The researcher or journalist needs to be prepared to read between the lines, “breaking through” the accumulation of words such as: “gang”, “bandit formations”, “Ukrainian-German bourgeois nationalists”, “Fascist Germany”, “Ukrainian-Jewish nationalists”, “terrorists”, “bourgeois spies”, “capitalist accomplices”, “bandit accomplices” and so on.

Quite often, the interrogation reports of participants of the liberation movement state that they were “recruited” in-
to the underground organization, forced to help the underground, were taken in “forcefully.” The detainees could even describe in detail such episodes of their lives to the investigators. Few talked frankly about their voluntary entry into the OUN or UPA, since this was a burdensome circumstance and deprived them of their hope for justification (which usually did not happen) or in receiving the shortest sentence possible in terms of imprisonment. So, the interrogation reports from all the AIF materials contain the most inventions and deliberate falsifications. They documented the “captive confessions” obtained during the investigation as caught by the plan of the officer, worked out according to the then political or ideological guidelines.

A striking moment is in many interrogation reports: after a long interrogation, the prisoner suddenly decides to “confess to the crimes committed.” The investigator then standardly reports this question: “Do you intend to speak the truth?” The answer to the following sentence is usually recorded as follows: “I decided to speak the truth,” “Under the weight of the evidence of the investigation, I decided to speak the truth,” and so on. This may mean that the detainee was subjected to torture during the investigation.

Another moment which should also be paid attention to: indication of the time of the beginning and end of the interrogation. It happens that the arrested has been in the investigator’s office for ten or more hours and has only answered two or three questions. One can only guess what happened to them there.

When confronted with such “suspicious” reports in the AIFs, one should definitely pay attention to the signature of the prisoner on each of the documents in the file, compare
them with the signatures of the previous report or other documents in the file. If, at first, the signature is clear and confident, and then is significantly different, if it is barely visible or simply “similar”, than this means that the detainee was tortured and exhausted.

It is important to note that self-confessions, as a rule, were not investigated and contradictions in their testimony was not clarified. This failure to confess guilt was not taken into account at all. At the same time, in cases were there was deliberate fabrication, the reports of the interrogation and confrontations contain a lot of reliable information on the lives of the repressed or about their historical events. So, in studying the AIFs, the biggest challenge is to set a boundary between reliable information and falsehoods, often torn out of the detainee by physical force.

The official directive of the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) concerning the physical methods used to influence the detainee has not been found in the archives yet. However, it is quite possible that oral permission was declared by Nikolai Yezhov at the meeting of NKVD heads on 16–20 July 1937.

The NKVD used torture during their investigations, in spite of the

Nikolai Yezhov — General Commissar for State Security, People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs (1936–1938). The term “Yezhovshchina” (the Great Terror) is derived from him — a period of time when the Stalinist repressions were brought to their maximum intensity.
prohibition of this method by the then criminal-procedural law by the CC VKP(B) (Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks). This is confirmed by Stalin’s telegram to the lower party bodies from 10 January 1939:

“The CC VKP(B) affirms that the use of physical pressure in the work of the NKVD has been permitted since 1937 in accordance with a resolution of the CC VKP(B)… It is known that all bourgeois secret services use physical pressure against representatives of the socialist proletariat and rely on especially savage methods of it. We might therefore ask why a socialist secret service should be any more humane in relation to inveterate agent of the bourgeoisie and sworn enemies of the working class and collectivized farmers. The CC VKP(B) believes that the use of physical pressure must absolutely be continued from here on in exceptional cases and against blatant and invidious enemies of the people, and that this is a perfectly appropriate and desirable method”.

**Example.** The well-known Ukrainian writer Valerian Pidmohylny was arrested on 4 December 1934 in Kharkiv, in the “Slovo” House. The reason was information that Pidmohylny was a participant of a counter-revolutionary terrorist organization, whose purpose was a terror campaign against the leadership of the Communist party.

During his interrogation, he categorically denied his guilt. At the same time, he was not afraid to accuse the party of the so-called “defeat of the Ukrainian counterrevolution.” Whether he knew about the previous experiences of his colleagues, or understood the absurdity and hopelessness of his situation, he denied all allegations.
And during his interrogation of 11 January 1935, Pidmohylny acknowledged his guilt completely. He agreed with the charges that he had conversations with anti-Soviet and terrorist groups among his writer friends. He explained this by the fact that he witnessed the horror of the Ukrainian village in 1932 (during the Holodomor) and blamed the Soviet authorities for this.

Such a sudden change was probably due to the use of the prohibited methods of investigation. Pidmohylny’s signature at the end of one particular interrogation report was barely written, and near this a drop of blood.

Another example — when the arrested died of their beatings, but the investigation documents indicated the death occurred due to natural causes such as illnesses.

After two interrogations, Dr. Abram Yakubovych Shtreiker, a doctor of medical sciences and a doctor in the UPA whose nom-de-guerre was “Popper”, died on 27 June 1944 in the Derazhnia investigative detention center of the NKGB. The reason indicated on the death certificate — heart
failure. Perhaps, the heart of the 60-year-old man could not stand it any longer — but was it not from the KGB’s torture?

What tools can be applied to separate factual information from fictitious? The first is to connect the relationship presented in the AIFs with the prosecution’s scheme. If they are not directly related, then their truthfulness can be considered high: there is no sense of deliberate falsifications on part of the arrested and the investigator.

It should be noted, that the suspect himself could hide his true biographical information. Let’s assume this was during a national operation (Polish, German, Zionist, Czech, etc.) of the Great Terror of 1937–38: when it was necessary to prove the nationality of the detainee, he himself could simply not confess to the true place of his birth, nationality, composition of his family, in order to protect them to some extent. At the same time, this information could also have been deliberately distorted by the investigator. Expecting the above noted limits by a number of convicts, he would simply record them as Ukrainian, Russian and Belarussian Poles or Germans — to the group that was appropriate to their surnames.

Another tool — a comparison of how adequate the social status of the accused was to the extent of the crime they were accused of committing. Let’s look at the testimony of a barely
literate peasant: “I was part of a counterrevolutionary organization, the purpose of which was the murder of Comrade Stalin, so I know who the leader of this organization is,” — and named people or a list of people who need to be investigated. Or when the butcher of the cooperative was accused of collecting information about the political mood of his clients in order to drop this off in a foreign state’s consulate.

Working with the AIFs, it is also necessary to pay special attention to the interrogation reports of witnesses, since
they are often used when the arrested flatly refused the accusations made against them. Sometimes, it seemed that one interrogation report was produced by a number of witnesses, who come up in the investigation and changed the original information. The identity of witness statements is not only about the level of facts or order of their presentation, but also in the form of presentation which should be alarming. On the other hand, in the interrogation of witnesses, one can also find valuable biographical information about the arrested person, which they themselves did not reveal for whatever reason.

It is also necessary to verify the typewritten and handwritten variants of the interrogation report. All reports should be checked to see if they are signed by the arrested, in order for the investigator to not have fabricated the confession and put it forward without speaking to the accused themselves.

**Example.** Myron Matviyeiko, nom-de-guerre “Usmikh” — the head of the OUN Units Abroad Security Service. On the night of 15 May 1951, a group of 5 OUN emissaries jumped from an English military aircraft into the Ternopil region — near the village of Byshky. On 5 June they were captured near Kalne in Zboriv raion of the same area by a special group of MGB of the Uk.SSR consisting of 19 legendary employees, who
have already had dozens of liquidations and underground detentions.

During one of the interrogations, conducted by Pavel Sudoplatov (a famous Soviet secret service agent who killed the leader of the OUN, Yevhen Konovalets), the Chekist asked Matviyeiko if he knows about the murder of OUN(M) (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists — Melnyk Branch) members Senyk or Stsiborsky in Zhytomyr in 1944. Both knew that this murder was organized by an agent of the NKVD, and not in 1944 but in 1941. However, in the interrogation report, “Usmikh” allegedly answered: he knew that this murder was carried out by the leading member of Bandera's Branch of OUN Mykola Klymyshyn in 1944.

This is an Example of a clear falsification of information by the repressive state. Firstly, the murder was organized by a NKVD agent. Secondly, there are disagreement over the years. Thirdly, in 1944 Mykola Klymyshyn was imprisoned in the Auschwitz concentration camp. And finally — the interrogation report was not signed by Myron Matviyeiko.

Separately, one should consider the history of these “traitors” of the resistance movement. They were not always overtaken by force or promises of a better life and their testimonies are an invaluable source of information. From the interrogation reports of a “broken” underground member, one can learn about the structures of the resistance movement, personnel composition and work details. Often, this is information that cannot be obtained from any other source.

Example — the interrogation reports of Artemiziya Halytska. A former OUN leader in Bukovyna, she gave a brief but detailed picture of the peculiarities of underground activity in the territory she controlled, names and positions of
units and their participants. But the question arises: is this “traitor” really telling the truth in her testimony? The answer to that question is in a different source of the repressive agencies’ archives.

This “betrayal” occurred as a result of a special NKVD operation, which the underground called a “barrel” and in Chekist documents appears as a “lettered action.”

Therefore, Artemiziya Halytska, nom-de-guerre of “Motria”, was captured by the Chekists on 27 December 1944, four months before her official arrest. During her detention, she tried to commit suicide — shooting herself in the head. But the Chekists did not let her die — they immediately sent her for an operation in a Chernivtsi hospital under increased security.

Artemisia was arrested along with another underground member, Myroslav Haiduk who quickly “broke” during his investigation. He said the following about his leader, that she “will never give the necessary evidence against the OUN and UPA in Bukovyna”. Therefore, the Chekists created a successful deception: organizing the “kidnapping” of the woman from the hospital by “OUN members.” The operation was conducted on Christmas Day, 7 January 1945. The “underground” delivered Artemiziya to a confidential apartment in Chernivtsi, brought a doctor to her who would continue her treatment.

“Motria”, who at one time organized an escape from a hospital for her underground friend, believed this as her
salvation. As she became better, the pseudo-underground member “Taras” announced that he was instructed to conduct an investigation on behalf of the OUN Leadership, in order to find out the cause of the failures of the underground cells after her arrest. The investigation was to be conducted by a pseudo-employee of the SB (OUN Security Service), “Ivan”, to whom Artemiziya was to submit a complete list of underground members in order to check for and detect provocateurs.

As a result of this pseudo-interrogation, the Chekists received information about 242 members of the OUN in Bukovyna, as well as UPA members and information on underground members in other areas. In total — more than 600 people!

This Example shows how misleading the source of the interrogation report can be. On the one hand, it is possible to gather valuable information from it, but on the other — it gives false conclusions.

However, It should be noted that the example with “Motria” is not typical. Quite often the arrested, for some reason or another, did “break” and told the investigator everything they knew about this or that structure, its personal composition, etc. Often, these “broken” members of the resistance movement became agents and fought against their yesterday’s comrades in arms as a part of combat agent or Cheka-military groups.

There were also cases when the arrested told the investigators a lot of information, but it was incomplete. Some leaders of the resistance movement provided the investigation information only about those who were either already arrested or dead. Such a strategy did not always work, and at times it had the opposite effect.
To assess the objectivity of the information in an AIF, it is also necessary:

- to connect the features of the repressive policies of that period which the AIF belongs to. The greatest number of falsifications, even the complete fabrication of events, falls to the second half of the 1930s when the repressions were massive. Depending on the political conjuncture, participants of the resistance movement may appear in documents as, for *Example*, “Ukrainian-German bourgeois nationalists” — when the need arose to blame them as collaborators with the Nazis, then as the “Ukrainian-Jewish nationalists” — when, after the Second World War, the nationalists in the West established contacts with the Zionist organizations.

Editorial cartoon from the Soviet Magazine “Perets”, where the cooperation of Ukrainian nationalists and Zionists is being laughed at
to study the historical situation in which the AIF emerged, and which is reflected in the interrogation reports and eye witness statements. Knowing about these political and socio-economic peculiarities inherent in that particular period, gives the opportunity to establish the causes and orientation of falsifications. For example: during the “Cold War” in the USSR, almost any citizen who had the slightest contact with the West came into sight of the repressive bodies.

carry out a comparative analysis of the information on the content in the file itself — all these documents, including different parts of it — the period of repression and the period of rehabilitation, — with other historical sources of the time.

However, the interrogation reports of the AIF should not on their own be a source of independent research. It is

An interesting example is the online archive of the CIA, where there are more than 10,000 documents covered by the search word of “Ukraine” — www.cia.gov/library/readingroom
necessary to verify the information with other documents of repressive agencies, press materials, documents of underground organizations, available information from foreign intelligence services about this trial or event, etc.

The effectiveness of assessing the reliability of information from the interrogation reports depends on the complex application of these criteria, tools and methods which are an integral part of the general methodology of processing the AIFs.

**Resolution on Designation / Presentation of the Charges**

When the investigative case is considered complete, there is a resolution on the charges being applied. It specifies the essence and certain article/articles of the criminal code which the crimes are qualified under.

A common misconception is that, if the accused signed such a resolution, he agreed with the prosecution. Actually no. After such a decision, he had to follow the interrogation report, where the arrested was prosecuted, explained the core and content of the accusation, as well as asking whether he pleads guilty. Under pressure or other methods of exposure, the arrested often found themselves guilty. But there are cases when they only partially or completely denied the charges made against them. Often the defendant filed a rebuttal in the courtroom, if he had such a possibility in cancelling their complaints/applications.

**Example** — the case of the famous dissident and poet Vasyl Stus. He refused to sign all investigative documents. The 1972 resolution was as follows:
“In December 1971 and in January 1972, STUS, while in treatment at the ‘Svitanok’ sanatorium in the town of Morshyn, Lviv oblast, in conversations with a resting Matskevych P.M., Kyslynsky V.V. and Sidorov V.I. expressed anti-Soviet and slanderous judgements.

Outlining his hostile views, Stus offensively spoke about the founder of the Soviet state, V.I. Lenin, praised life in the capitalist countries, argued that in the capitalist countries there are supposedly broader democratic freedoms there rather than in the USSR, slandered the material situation of the working people in our country and praised the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, who waged an armed struggle against Soviet power, and called them the liberators of the Ukrainian people”.

“In this way, — the investigator Loginov concluded, — Stus committed a crime as per Art. 62, par. 1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. Based on the above, guided by arts. 131–132 and the Criminal Procedural Code of the Uk.SSR, Decreed. Previously, Stus Vasyl Semenovych was accused under art. 1871 of the CC of the Uk.SSR, this changed,
and the accused was drawn as an offense under art. 62, p. 1 of the CC of the Uk.SSR in the above-state volume, which was announced to him”.

Stus refused to sign the decree.

An Example from 1980. During the search of the V. Stus’ house, poems, notebooks, letters, materials from his 1972 case was removed as well as documents on the situation of political prisoners and a request to travel to the United States. The search warrant indicates that Stus did not sign it, saying he “does not want to have any conversations with the representatives of bloody organizations”.

Specific Documents: Certificates, Statements, Requests from Other Authorities

This group is diverse in its content as these documents are beyond the scope of the investigative process. However, it increases the information potential of the AIF, increasing its value as a historical source. These include acts of conclusions of expert commissions on the performance of the officials on the accused, information of village councils, and other materials on the creative work of the repressed (theoretical works, academic reviews, articles, draft resolutions of the party and Soviet bodies), which is recognized as “ideologically harmful”. One can also come across an autobiography, performance reports, service records, excerpts from party organization meeting minutes to which the accused belong to and so on.

At the end of the investigation, a Report on the Conclusion of the Investigation was created. The arrested was given a chance to review the materials of the investigation (of-
ten very briefly) and possibly supplement something (which almost never happened). After that, the **indictment** was drawn up. The documents of the 1920s-1930s often lack the following: the right of the prosecuted to familiarize themselves with the materials of the investigation which was regularly violated during this period of time.

**Medical Examination Act**

This was created as needed: on the state of the health and the diagnosis of diseases, if any. In addition, it was noted what level of severity of physical labour the imprisoned can be put under.

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**The Indictment**

**The Indictment** — a procedural document in which the investigator summarizes the preliminary investigation into the case and substantiates the offense committed by the person and the sufficiency of grounds for consideration of the
case in court. As a historical source, this document is valuable in that it reflects the contemporary socio-political atmosphere, and also illustrates the absurdity of accusations under the law.

Furthermore, events such as the prosecutor not agreeing with the indictment or abolishing some of its provisions and reinstating the case for further investigation was almost never practiced. Even during the period of political repressions, such cases were isolated.

It should be noted that the indictment specifies the exact dates of the arrest and the completion of the investigation. It also specifies whether there is any real evidence and personal documents in the file.

After receiving approval by the prosecutor to conclude the case, it was referred to the court (a court or military tribunal) or extrajudicial authorities.

Extra-Judicial Bodies
of the NKVD-MGB-MVD of the USSR

“Dvoiky” were created in 1934 in order to deal with cases of terrorist acts, counter-revolutionary activities, anti-Soviet agitation and so on. The structure of these “dvoiky” included the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs and the USSR Prosecutor. Cases were heard without calling upon the accused or witnesses and therefore this extrajudicial authority performed a purely technical role — it sped up the issuance of imprisonment sentences (in concentration camps or prisons) or the death penalty.
After Nikolai Yezhov became the head of the NKVD in September 1936 and initiated his mass repressive operations, there was a surge of arrests and consequently the number of “dvoiky” increased.

According to the orders of the USSR NKVD from 11 August and 20 September 1937, a list of persons who were subject to repression could be identified by a “dvoiky” consisting of members of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Republic or the head of the relevant NKVD administration along with the prosecutor of the Soviet Republic, krais or oblast. Lists of the “dvoiky” sentences were sent to the USSR NKVD to be signed by the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Republic, heads of the NKVD departments and the prosecutors of the respective republics, territories or oblasts. The verdict was executed after the approval of the NKVD and the USSR prosecutor.

To convey the guilt of the mass repressions upon Yezhov, on the eve of his fall, on 17 November 1938, the supreme leadership of the USSR — the Sovnarkom and the CC of the VKP(b) — adopted a joint resolution “On the Arrests, Prosecutor’s Supervision and Investigation,” where “disadvantages” and “distortions” were noted in the work of NKVD authorities. On 26 November, Lavrentiy Beria, the new People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, issued the order “On the procedure of implementing the resolution of the SNK of the USSR and the CC VKP(b) from 17 November 1938” that the “dvoika” was abolished.

**The “Troika”** existed during the Great Terror of 1937–1938, and usually acted at the oblast levels. They included the head of the NKVD unit, the secretary of the party’s
Волodymyr Birchak

 NKVD of the USSR Order No. 00447
oblast committee and the prosecutor. When the “troika” was under the OGPU Collegium — the predecessor of the NKVD — it was used to pass sentences on criminal offences. This was until 31 July 1937, when Nikolai Yezhov signed NKVD order No. 00447 “About repression of former kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements.” It set the tasks of defeating the “anti-Soviet elements” and defined the functioning of the “operational troika” with accelerated judgements of such cases.

This order was approved by the CC plenum of the VKP(b). The “troika” usually consisted of: the local chief of the NKVD (head), the prosecutor and the first secretary of the oblast, krai or republic committee of the VKP(b). Each
region of the Soviet Union was set a quota of cases of the “first category” (execution) and “second category” (from 8–10 years in camps) when the sentences were established.

The simplified legal proceedings contradicted the norms of the “Stalinist” Constitution of the USSR, adopted in 1936. In particular, art. 111 guaranteed Soviet citizens the openness of a trial and the right of the accuse for a fair defence, and did not provide for any exceptions (including extrajudicial bodies, such as “troiky”). And according to art. 102, judicial functions in the USSR could only be performed by the court. The then criminal and criminal-procedural code of the USSR also did not contain any provisions which would allow the functioning of NKVD “troiky” instead of judicial bodies.

By issuing order No. 00447, which was essentially a law, the NKVD went beyond its competence. According to its legislative status, the state special services could issue only subordinate legislation, executive and administrative acts, not going beyond the relevant laws of the USSR. The existence of the NKVD “troiky”, therefore, even from the point of view of Soviet legislation, went beyond the legal field. The fact is indicative of the Soviet “legality” of the Stalinist period.

**Special Councils (OSO)** have a somewhat longer history than the two previous extrajudicial bodies, since they existed during the Russian Empire. The OSO was formed in accordance with the provisions “On measures for the protection of public order and public rest” from 14 (26) August 1881 and acted under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of two senior officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and two from the Ministry of Justice. It considered cases on ad-
ministrative exiles for up to 5 years for people suspected of involvement in state crimes or who were politically unreliable. The final decision was made by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

The OSO under the OGPU of the USSR and the OSO under the GPU of the Uk.SSR (1924–1934) were formed in accordance with the approval of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the USSR on 28 March 1924, the provision on the rights of the OGPU regarding administrative exile, expulsion and imprisonment in concentration camps. It consisted of three members of this department and had the exclusive right to imprison someone up to 3 years in a concentration camp or to expel persons within the USSR or abroad, who were: involved in counter-revolutionary activities, espionage and other state crimes; suspected of smuggling or illegally crossing the border; counterfeiters, for whom there was insufficient ground to bring to trial; currency and precious metal speculators.

The referral decision was made in the presence of the prosecutor's representative. He could suspend it and appeal to the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR. Before it, the OSO under the OGPU periodically reported on its activities.

The OSO under the GPU of the Uk.SSR was formed consisting of the heads of the GPU and two other members. They had rights to

Photo of jewels confiscated from a speculator
exile only within the republic: those suspected of gangsterism, robbery, destruction; people without certain occupations (card-sharperers, scammers, drug traffickers, black market speculators, owners of houses of depravity, etc.); people who had previously had two convictions or four counts by law enforcement agencies on suspicion of committing property crimes or encroaching upon a person and their dignity (hooliganism, conspiracy, etc.). The OSO under the GPU of the Uk.SSR reported its activity before the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the OGPU.

The legal status of the OSO under the NKVD of the USSR was determined by a ruling of the CEC and SNK of the USSR on 5 September 1934. The meeting was headed by the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and it con-
sisted of: his deputy, authorized by the NKVD of the USSR, the head of the Main Directorate of the Workers-Peasants’ Militia, the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union Republic where the file came from. The Union Prosecutor or his deputy were obliged to take part in the OSO sessions, and could challenge its decisions to the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR.

The OSO under the NKVD of the USSR had the right to apply for administrative deportation (including beyond the boundaries of the USSR), exile, imprisonment in correctional labour camps for up to a 5 year term. And after the decision of the State Defence Committee from 17 September 1941 and the USSR NKVD order from 21 September of the same year, it received the right to sentence to the highest degree of punishment (execution) in cases of counter-revolutionary and especially dangerous crimes against the USSR’s administrative order, which was investigated by the NKVD authorities. The OSO was also allowed to decide on the reduction of the term of exile or length of stay in the labour camps due to a person’s exemplary behaviour or high production rates.

The OSO under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR appeared after the transformation of the NKVD into the MVD on 15 March 1946 for extrajudicial consideration of cases which were conducted by the state security authorities, and the Politburo of the CC VKP(b) on 20 August of the same year decided to also form an OSO under the MGB of the USSR. Subsequently, they were united into one OSO — under the MVD of the USSR. It consisted of the Union Ministers of Internal Affairs and their deputies. The sessions
were attended by the General Prosecutor of the USSR and his deputy.

The OSO under the MVD of the USSR was eliminated under the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on 1 September 1954 “in order to strengthen socialist legality and increase the role of Soviet justice.” All investigative affairs conducted by the OSO of the MVD, were to be sent exclusively to the courts, and only in the cases of a person committing a crime stipulated under Soviet criminal law.

The excerpt from the meeting minutes of the extrajudicial body, attached to the file, contain the main information about the accused, as well as fixing of their sentence. In the AIFs brought about during the period of mass repressions, especially during the Great Terror, this document is usually missing. A copy could be retrieved if it was part of a rehabilitation file: the persons in charge of it would appeal for such a copy to the MGB of the USSR archives, in order to restore the information in the file.

**Minutes of the Court Session/Military Tribunal and the Verdict**

Most of the meetings were closed and held without the participation of the defence (lawyer) or prosecution (prosecutor). Also, unless it was about the indicative political trial, with the call for witnesses, etc. The verdict was formed as a result of the court session, the plot of the prosecution was indicated and the measure of punishment was defined. The minutes of the court session itself are valuable because at times the defendant tried to speak during the investigation
in order to complain about torture or voice his last words, and this was recorded.

**Example.** During a meeting on 7 December 1949, Father Josyf Rydel, who was accused of anti-Soviet agitation told the judge: “I believe and stand for the Vatican’s faith, my Catholic rite, I believe in the Greek-Catholic Church and I will believe in it until the end of my days.” The last words of the priest to the court: “Whatever the judgement against me you make, I will accept it, because it is not from this authority, but from God.”

The minutes of such court hearings are also valuable when the court proceedings began to develop through torture during the preliminary investigation: the accused tried to use the last opportunity to throw off the fictitious accusations and reject the forced confession and explain that he was forced to resort to this “self-implcation.” Thus, witnesses could adjust their testimonies. Sometimes, albeit very rarely, after such a situation the trial was returned to the investigators and the trial eventually passed a milder sentence.

**Example.** Despite all the objections of Ivan Tsymbal to the charges against him, his case was transferred to the court. At
court, he explained that during his interrogations, he was repeatedly brutally beaten and forced to sign a confession to crimes he did not commit. As a result, according to the verdict of the Military Tribunal of the NKVD troops in the Ternopil oblast from 13 July 1945, he was considered innocent and released from custody.

The role of the defence, if its representatives were present in the courtroom, for the most part was reduced to statisticians. Sometimes they simply tried to reduce the amount of punishment and rarely actually worried about the fate of the prisoner.

Example. The repressed literary critic and publicist Yuriy Badzio recalled his lawyer in the following way:

“The authorities offered their lawyer and I did not create any problems with this...We were protected according to the same criteria: to find any positives in our behaviour and to oppose the accusation and the very idea of the crime. You must understand, all of these trials were deprived of competition with the authorities, with the prosecutor’s office and the prosecutors. It was only about the interpretation of the situation by the lawyer in such a way as to mitigate the sentence. In addition, the lawyer — was my only connection with my family. I was in good relations with my lawyer Liudmyla Petrivna, my wife Svitlana Kyrychenko — also. So I have no complaints toward Liud-
myla Korytchenko. She came to me, we talked, she offered me some chocolate, probably from my wife. Everything was very normal”.

Another example is from the defence of the wife of an UPA soldier.

The trial against Volodymyr Cherkavskyi and Petrunelia Shcherban was held on 28 December 1967. At the trial, Cherkavskyi admitted his guilt partially. He explained that he did not take part in the terrorization of the population, and he did not want to kill the policeman but only to frighten him.

Shcherban admitted her guilt completely. At the same time, she explained to the court that she hid Volodymyr because she loved him.

Shcherban’s lawyer at the end of the meeting petitioned the court to confine Petrunelia to a conditional sentence due to her health and insignificance of her crimes. Cherkavskyi received 10 years in a penal colony under strict regime and
5 years of exile and full confiscation of property. Shcherban received 3 years in a correctional-labour colony.

In January 1968, lawyers for the defendants filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court of the USSR asking them to review the sentence since the crimes of the defendants were insignificant, and also, that they have already paid a high price for their freedom during their 23 years of life in the underground. The Supreme Court decided to release Shcherban from custody while the verdict against Cherka-vskyi remained intact.

**An example** of a lawyer’s inactivity was Viktor Medvedchuk, the defence for Vasyl Stus. In his appeal to the court, the latter only managed to do the following:

“Friends of the court!

The subject of this trial has already had three days of this criminal case based on accusations against Vasyl Semenovych Stus in committing crimes stipulated by art. 62, vol. 2 of the CC of Ukraine and vol. 2, p. 70 of the CC of the RRFSR. I consider such characterization of his acts as valid.

But before sentencing, I ask you to take into account all the circumstances which characterize the defendant, his attitude toward work, his physical condition and his state of health, all these circumstances deserve attention and require a careful study from Your side.
This is due to not only to the requirement of the law, but also to the fact that only taking this into account, when choosing the penalty in the council’s chambers, will it be justified and fair”.

Stus was condemned and sent to the camps, where he died. But his case took yet another turn.

On 2 August 1990, the Judicial college in the criminal case of the Supreme Court of the Uk.SSR reviewed a protest made by the prosecutor of the Uk.SSR and accepted that the verdict against Stus be thrown out, and the case closed due to a lack of a crime and confirmed the position held by Stus in court.

The fact that Stus was acquitted by the Soviet court under Soviet legislation (in 1990 this was corresponding to an article of the Criminal Code while the law on the rehabilitation of victims of political repression appeared almost a year later) testifies that his lawyer had all the legal ground to deny and not confess to Stus’ guilt in the Kyiv City Court. So the question arises: did Medvedchuk protect his defendant properly?

Sentences, in addition to a certain period of imprisonment, often included deprivation of rights as according to art. 29 of the Criminal Code of the Uk.SSR (1927–1960). In short, they were deprived of:

- right to vote in active and passive elections;
- right to hold elected positions in public organizations;
- right to hold certain public positions;
- right to hold an honorary title;
- parental rights;
- right to a pension and unemployment benefits.
Execution of Sentences
(in Case of Extreme Punishment)

This document specifies the name of the authority that ordered the sentence, the date and time of the shooting (very rarely — hanging). The burial place of the victim was not indicated. This document, however, is especially important (and may be considered the main one) with references to the date and cause of the person’s death, about whom archival research is being conducted.

Les Kurbas’ Execution Act

It should be noted that the USSR KGB order No. 108cc from 1955 contained a requirement to falsify this information. During inquiries, the relatives of those who were shot were to be informed that the person died in prison, indicating even an illness that allegedly caused their death. Places of mass burials of the victims of Stalin’s repressions remained classified even during the breakdown of Stalin’s cult.
**Example.** In 1959 in the graves at an old Russian cemetery in Chernihiv (6 Starobilouska St.) there were almost 3000 people solemnly reburied who were found during the construction on Tykha-St., between the Yelets'kyi Dormition Monastery and the prison (today — the Chernihiv Investigative Prison). Officially, the government announced that these were victims of the Nazi terror.

The “right” public opinion about the mass graves of the victims of the NKVD in the Bykivnia forest near Kyiv was to be formed by the conclusions of the governmental commission (1944, 1971 and 1987) where it was argued that the bodies of the prisoners of war of the Darnyiia POW camp were killed by the Nazis.

**Appeal and Clemency Plea**

**AN APPEAL REQUEST** on the verdict or sentencing which was not acquired through legal forces, was submitted by the defence representatives or by the convicted person upon the end of their trial, challenging its decision. Sometimes the verdict could indicate that it was not subject to appeal. From this source, one can obtain additional information about the circumstances of the investigative process, biographical information of the person and so on.

**REQUESTS FOR PARDONS** were made when the person was already serving their sentence. They could be submitted to the oblast commissions for reviewing criminal cases on behalf of the prisoners and their relatives.

The decision was filed for approval with the judicial authority. For the most part, such commission decisions usual-
ly rejected a petition for pardon, however, sometimes, they could appeal to the prosecutor and obtain early release of the prisoner.

**Rehabilitation Materials**

The rehabilitation of victims of political repression in the USSR, including in the Uk.SSR, began after the death of Joseph Stalin, during the “Khrushchev thaw”. First, came the decree from the Presidium of the VR of the USSR on 27 March 1953, on the partial amnesty of prisoners. He did not foresee the amnesty of citizens convicted for counter-revolutionary crimes for more than 5 years, but this was already a step to de-Stalinizing Soviet society.

The process of rehabilitation began in September 1953, when the Supreme Court of the USSR was granted the right to reconsider decisions of the former GPU colleges, “dvoika”, “troika” and “special councils” of the NKVD-MGB-MVD of the USSR under appeal of the USSR Attorney General.

The first decisions on rehabilitation were taken cautiously, taking into account the alignment of forces in the political leadership of the country. It began with the review of cases of repressed party and state figures and their family members.

In the mass media, the process of liberating those from concentration camps and prisons began in May 1954, after the ruling of the SM of the USSR “On reviewing criminal cases against individuals, convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes which are kept in camps, colonies and prisons of the MVD of the USSR and are in exile in settlements.”
A new wave of rehabilitations fell during Gorbachev’s “restructuring.” By a resolution of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU from 11 July 1988, “On additional measures to end work, related to the rehabilitation of unreasonably repressed in the 1930–1940’s and early 1950’s” was entrusted to the prosecutor and the KGB of the USSR together with the local authorities to continue work on the review of cases of people deprived of their liberties during Stalin’s time, without the need to apply for rehabilitation and complaints from the repressed.

In January 1989, the Presidium of the VR of the USSR issued a decree “On additional measures to restore justice to the victims of repression that took place in the 1930–1940’s and early 1950’s”, which provided for the revision of AIFs, decisions of which were taken by extrajudicial authorities. All repressed people, who received sentences as a result of a meeting of the “dvoika”, “troika” of the NKVD and their departments, OGPU colleges, “special meetings” were rehabilitated. Exceptions were traitors to the Motherland, torturers, Nazi criminals, law enforcement officers involved in falsifying criminal cases as well as those who committed murder.

However, public suggestions on the rehabilitation of repressed people by political articles of the 1920’s to the first half of the 1980’s was not taken into account. It was not until the law from the Verkhovna Rada of the Uk.SSR on 17 April 1991 entitled “On the rehabilitation of victims of political repressions in Ukraine” that it extended to all unreasonable sentences by the Ukrainian courts or those repressed in its territory by other state authorities in any form from 1917 to 1991. In accordance with the requirements of this law, as
well as the decree of the VR of Ukraine from 24 December 1993 “On the interpretation of the Ukrainian law ‘On the rehabilitation of victims of political repression in Ukraine’”, the prosecutor’s office and courts rehabilitated 248,810 people between 1991–2001. In total, during the second half of the 1950’s–2000’s there were 740,120 rehabilitated people who were sentenced for anti-Soviet agitation, violation of the law on the separation of church and state, as well as members of the resistance movement, or if there was no evidence of their involvement in murder and other violent acts in their AIFs.

These documents are unique because:

➤ they are products, a source from another historical period, when the policy of repression was condemned and subsequently qualified as a criminal;

➤ sometimes rehabilitation measures provided for additional investigation of a case to verify the facts, obtained at the preliminary stage or trial, if there were any. Especially worthy of attention is that the same people are being interviewed, who were involved in the case during the repressions. Their new testimonies were very different from the past. Often, this had to do with the methods by which they were obtained. Comparing the interrogation protocols from the repressive and rehabilitated units of the AIF can help determine the truthfulness of a given fact, a real picture or background to individual events.

➤ when reviewing cases of rehabilitation, a review of some preliminary investigation information was carried out by security agencies through the archival institutions of the former USSR, access to which is now almost none existent.
Control-Supervision Files, Control-Supervision Proceedings

This procedural appendix did not occur in all the AIFs. During the course of the trial, copies of various documents were made, such as: an order on the arrest or election of a preventative measure, indictment, an order on the extension of a detention, a sentence, etc.

Subsequently, documents were also filed in addition to this file which could not or were not considered necessary to add to the AIF. There may sometimes be agent reports, records of prison searches, some personal things or material evidence, etc. It happens that the control-supervision files were also involved and files of a prisoner from a correctional labour camp or a file on the confiscation of property after the declaration of a sentence.

These documents of the repressive authorities are also open, in accordance with Ukrainian law, so when working in the archives, one should ask the staff about the availability of such materials.

Content of the main “political” articles of the Criminal Code of the Uk.SSR

Counterrevolutionary crimes in the Criminal Code of the Uk.SSR, approved by the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on 8 June 1927, are included in only one article — 54, with 14 clauses and sub-paragraphs. They foresee signs of the following crimes:
54-1 “a”. Betrayal of the Motherland. Shooting with confiscation of all property, and under mitigating circumstances — imprisonment for 10 years with confiscation of all property.

54-1 “b”. Betrayal of the Motherland by a Serviceman. The highest measure of social protection — shooting with the confiscation of all property.

54-1 “c”. Assistance of a Serviceman`s Family Members in his Fleeing Abroad — imprisonment for five to ten years with the confiscation of all property. For all other adult members of the “traitor’s” family who lived with him or were subscribed with him for this crime — deprivation of electoral rights and exile to remote districts of Siberia for five years.

54-1 “d”. Failure of a Serviceman to Report About a Betrayal Attempt — imprisonment for ten years. Failure of other citizens (non-military) to report about the betrayal — imprisonment for at least six years.

52-2. Armed Uprising — shooting or a declaration as the enemy of the worker with a confiscation of property, with the deprivation of citizenship and expulsion outside the USSR forever. under mitigating circumstances — a reduction to imprisonment for at least three years, with the confiscation of all or a part of their property.

54-3. Relations with foreign states for hostile purposes, measures of social protection, specified in art. 54-2.

54-4. Assisting the international bourgeoisie, for this: imprisonment — at least three years, confiscation of all or a part of property. under particularly difficult circumstances — increase the term of imprisonment, shooting or declaration of an enemy of the workers with the confiscation of proper-
ty, deprivation of citizenship and expulsion from the USSR forever.

54-5. Inclination of foreign state to war against the USSR. Shooting or declaration as an enemy of the workers, confiscation of property and deprivation of citizenship and expulsion from the USSR forever. under mitigating circumstances — imprisonment for at least three years, with the confiscation of all or part of their property.

54-6. Espionage. Imprisonment for at least three years, confiscation of all or part of property, and in some cases, when the espionage caused or could have caused grave consequences for the interests of the USSR, — shooting or declaration as an enemy of the workers, confiscation of property, deprivation of citizenship and expulsion out of the USSR forever.

54-6 “a”. Transfer of state secrets abroad — imprisonment in labour camps for eight to twelve years.

(dislosure to private individuals) — imprisonment in corrective labour camps for five to ten years.

(transfer of inventions, discoveries and technical improvements that constitute state secrets abroad) — imprisonment in corrective labour camps for ten to fifteen years.

54-6 “b”. Loss of documents constituting state secrets — imprisonment in corrective-labour camps for four to six years. Under aggravating circumstances — imprisonment in corrective-labour camps for six to ten years.

54-7. Sabotage. For the undermining of state industry, transport, trade, monetary circulation or credit system, etc., measures of social protection referred to in art. 54-2.

54-8. Terrorism, measures of social protection, referred to in art. 54-2.
54-9. **Diversion**, measures of social protection, referred to in art. 54-2.

54-10. **Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda**, imprisonment for at least six months. For the same actions during riots or while using religious and national superstitions against the masses, either in the military environment, or in areas declared as martial law, measures for social protection referred to in art. 54-2.

54-11. **Any participation in counterrevolutionary organizations**, measures for social protection specified in the relevant articles of this section are applied.

54-12. **Failure to report to the authorities on counter-revolutionary crimes**, imprisonment for at least six months.

54-13. **Active activity against the revolutionary movement during the Tsarist Regime and during the Civil War**, measures of social protection referred to in art. 54-2.

54-14. **Counterrevolutionary sabotage**, imprisonment for at least one year, with the confiscation of all or part of property, in particularly aggravating circumstances — shooting with the confiscation of property.

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Agents' Files are one of the most interesting and often most requested sources from the archives of the former repressive agencies.

Many of them were destroyed due to them “not constituting a practical, historical or cultural value” on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. The “great purge” was provoked by the Velvet Revolution in Eastern Europe, a result of which was large arrays of documents of the state security agencies being placed into the hands of the new democratic powers.

The order was entitled “On Approval of the List of Documentary Materials of the USSR KGB and the Terms of their Storage” and did not give any direct instructions on the destruction of documents, which was a violation of procedure. However, the “personal and work agents' files, holders of secret and confidential apartments, files of confidential apartments and unsuccessful recruitments” were prescribed to “not be stored”. In this way, secret instructions to destroy all such documents were given.

As an exception to this order, the personal agents' files were preserved, those who performed special tasks of the state security agencies in the enemy’s rear during the German-Soviet war; materials about the activities of reconnais-
sance and sabotage units and special groups that were created by Soviet state agencies during the Second World War; personal files of agents and residents who participated in the fight against the underground movement in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States. Also, with permission from the leadership of the oblast KGB departments and higher, those files that had special operational and historical value were also allowed to be kept. However, the destruction process even covered those categories that fell under the “protected” status.

Today, the SSU Archive in Kyiv has over 3,000 volumes of personal and work agents' files from 1922–1991. The documents of these fonds consist of personal and work agents' files, files with reports on operational and combat activity of the separate intelligence-divisionary, Cheka-military groups, special units and resident spies of the NKVD-NKGB of the Uk.SSR during the German-Soviet War of 1941–1945 in occupied territories. These fonds also contain lettered
files from the 4th (Rear) Directorate of the NKVD-NKGB of the Uk.SSR. During the war, this unit organized intelligence, sabotage, subversion and counter-intelligence activities in the occupied territories.

Card catalogues with information about agents were also destroyed. There is currently no separate list of agents of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB that could be reviewed or made public.

Information about the cooperation of certain people with the repressive agencies can be obtained from documents in the agents' files, as well as reports, orders, documents of operational materials, etc.

It is necessary to distinguish between personal and work agents' files. 

**Work agent files** contain messages written by the agent, as well as information on meetings with operational officers.

**Personal agents’ files (Resident Spies)** stores information about the identity of the agent (spy) of the state security agencies, as well as the results of his special examination, about his recruitment and his work with an operational officer. In addition, the personal spy files include an accounting report of all the agent’s contacts.

The following documents can be found in the personal and work agents' files fonds in the SSU Archive in Kyiv:

- personal and work files on agents who were involved in operational activities in the 1920s and 1930s;
➢ files on agents who participated in the operations of the Soviet state security agencies to detect and stop the activities of foreign special services;
➢ files on agents who participated in the detection and cultivation of foreigners who arrived in Ukraine as diplomats, journalists, specialists and who were suspected of belonging to a foreign special services;
➢ files on agents — foreign citizens, who provided political, economic, military and operational information about the country in which they lived;
➢ files on agents that were used in the cultivation and termination of activities of political oppositions and their supporters, including the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist groups in Ukraine and abroad;
➢ orders, instructions, directives of the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR and Uk.SSR on the organization of operative-service activities of the “fourth units” of the Soviet state security agencies;
➢ memorandums, special and informational messages sent to the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR and the CC of the KP(b) regarding the results of the operational, reconnaissance-sabotage and combat activities of the “fourth units” of the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR;
➢ radiograms, special reports, reports from commanders of special forces of the NKVD of the Uk.SSR on the results of operational-service activities in the enemy’s rear;
documents on the operational situation in the occupied territory, German administration and special departments, Nazi crimes

documents on establishing and activity of the resident spies and operational groups of the “fourth unit” of the 4th Directorate in 1941–1945;

documents on the activities of partisan units created by the NKVD to fight the Nazi occupiers (reports, trophy documents, photographs);

documents on the organization and activity of operational groups sent into Eastern Europe in 1944–1945;

documents on the organization and activity of the agent-combat units of the MGB, who fought the Ukrainian liberation movement;

files on agents who participated in the fight with the OUN and UPA underground.

The information that a person was an agent should be carefully checked because even though an agent file exists, this does not mean that the person was engaged in any spy activity in favour of the Soviet secret service.

It should be noted that under the “planned-arrangement”, the top officials obliged operational staff to create an agent network with an appropriate number of agents. Those operatives of regional departments were often unable to fulfill these plans, so they resorted to falsifications. The network included people who did not know they were “agents”. Their surnames appeared only in the Chekist documents but they themselves never met with operatives or were identified only to verify documents — from which information was taken for their inclusion in the list of networks. Furthermore, the operatives recorded that the agents did not communi-
cate with them and suggested to exclude them from their network and remove them from their files.

There were also a number of cases where the agent’s work had positive results. For example, surveillance of a chemical plant for violations of production technology and safety precautions. Such activities prevented grave consequences, including industrial disasters.

However, often the tasks of the agents were related to the restriction of human rights and freedoms, along with their outlooks.

**Agent Categories**

The “Counter-Intelligence Dictionary”, published in 1972, submits 19 types of agents. The most common of them are below.

The **INTER-CELL AGENT** was used by an investigator to cultivation a person in a cell. These were recruited from convicts who found themselves guilty of committing a crime and honestly repented. Also, this was a temporary role that placed agents into cells of the investigatory detention center of the operational departments of the state security agencies. In exceptional cases and in the most important cases for inter-cell cultivation used operatives, with permission from the leadership of the KGB in the USSR.

**Example.** On 3 March 1950, officers of the MGB Directorate in the Lviv Oblast arrested Daria Husiak (“Niusia”), the courier of the Supreme Commander of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych.

Even during her “active interrogation” (torture) on 3–4 March, “Niusia” refused to reveal the place where
Shukhevych was hiding and told operatives about an area where he was not. To get this information, the MGB developed and staged a complex agent campaign using an inter-cell agent.

After Daria Husiak’s beating, she was sent to a “hospital” cell. In this “hospital” cell, an experienced agent by the name of “Rosa” was waiting for “Niusia”. She (“Rosa”) was densely smeared with green iodine — supposedly after a beating. After “coming to”, she began to tap out Morse code as a “message to the neighbouring cell”, and then wrote using a “hidden” pencil a message.

When the intrigued Husiak tried to look at the note, “Rosa” hid the piece of paper. In the end, Daria could no longer stand it and directly asked if this “misfortunate friend” had a connection with the underground. She kept silent for a long time and asked: “Do you know ‘Moneta’?” This was the nom-de-guerre of Kateryna Zarytska, who headed the Ukrainian Red Cross and was a courier for Shukhevych. “Moneta” was arrested in 1947.

“Rosa” reported that she is tapping to Zarytska, who is in the next cell. This made an impression on “Niusia”. And so contact was made between agent and the underground member.

On 4 March, “Rosa” returned from her interrogation and reported that the investigation had no evidence of her activities and she will be released. She suggested smuggling out a note to freedom, and “Niusia” decided to seize the oppor-
Husiak sent a message to Natalia Hrobak in the village of Bilohorshcha and detailed how to find the right house. And so, the MGB had a way to get Shukhevych. On 5 March, the UPA Supreme Commander died in battle in this village.

**Agent-militants** performed special tasks for military means. They were recruited mainly through Soviet patriots, ready with ideological motives to go on a decisive action that would risk their lives. Candidates were considered due to their relevant skills and personal qualities. Also, the agent-militant became members from enemy sabotage-reconnaissance groups who were enthusiastic recruits into the NKVD-KGB agencies. In the 1940s and 1950s, agent-militants were usually recruited from members of the nationalist underground in western Ukraine and the Baltics.

When appropriate, they were united into agent-militant groups. This deployment was reserved for the fight against enemy sabotage-reconnaissance groups and the nationalist underground.

**Example.** After the war, the Soviet repressive-punitive agencies made significant efforts against the Rivne underground to lay down their arms and surrender.

The largest provocation against the OUN and UPA in Volhynia began in the spring of 1945 in the Demydivka district. Later, this experience was transferred to other areas of western Ukraine. Reports on the “East’ Case” contained details
of the “legendary OUN District Leadership,” and managed to decipher the real names of some of their defectors.

The most active agents directed the liquidation of the local OUN and UPA personnel in 1945–46. They received the task of identifying the active OUN underground network and UPA troops from the NKVD Directorate of the Rivne Oblast. The insurgents were identified “in the dark” under the guise of oppositional groups to the existing OUN network and the SB terror. In fact, they were led by NKGB officers. Part of the UPA members were recruited, the rest were forced to surrender while the majority persisted — and were destroyed by any means possible under the guise of SB troops.

**Overseas agents** fulfilled tasks of state security abroad.

*Example.* Bohdan Stashynsky was born and raised in a patriotic Ukrainian family. His father was the head of the “Prosvita” in their village. His sisters — Iryna and Maria were
associated with the OUN underground. One of them had relations with “Karmeliuk”, the regional leader — and Stashynsky began his agents’ work with his murder.

The first serious task Stashynsky was assigned while abroad was to preparing the murder of one of the OUN leaders, the editor of the “Ukrainian Independentist” newspaper, Lev Rebet. In April 1957, he began surveillance on him. On 12 October 1957, on the steps of the office where Rebet worked, Stashynsky fired a gun with poison gas and disappeared from the crime scene. For two years, until the KGB agent fell into the western authorities’ hands, the official reason of Rebet’s death was considered a heart attack. The prize for this murder was 3000 rubles and 3000 marks.

In the summer of 1958 in Rotterdam at a memorial service for Col. Yevhen Konovalets, Stashynsky first heard Stepan Bandera speak. From January 1959, he began surveillance on him. He claimed that Bandera’s address received from a regular telephone book.

The Soviet secret service became interested in the information Stashynsky provided about Bandera and recall the agent to Moscow to meet with the KGB leadership. There, he was given a new task — to kill the OUN leader.

After a first unsuccessful attempt, Stashynsky went to Munich with this task. On 15 October 1959, he shot an unguarded Bandera at the entrance of his build-
ing. Although the OUN leader was always armed, the meeting with a young man with a newspaper under his arm probably did not seem suspicious. The newspaper hid the killer’s weapon which shot out poisoned gas. Bandera died in the ambulance.

**Double-Agent** cooperated simultaneously with two or more intelligence agencies.

Double-agent relationships can be different with various intelligence agencies. He can act in the interests of one and mislead the other, concealing their connection with one intelligence agency and create an image of honest cooperation. Or he could be open about his connection to different intelligence agencies and at the same time, provide them with interesting information.

**Example:** In the early 1950s, the OUN Abroad Units and the Foreign Representatives of Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council were planning to send two courier groups to Ukraine. They were assisted by Western special services: the OUN by the British, the USLC by the Americans.

The leading members of both organizations were to be flown in. From the USLC — Vasyl Okhrymovych, who during the war lead the OUN Leadership in western Ukraine, and from the OUN — Myron Matvieiko, the leader of the OUN Security Service. But the mission was doomed to fail. Kim Philby, from the British intelligence agency, SIS, was recruited by the Bolsheviks.
At that time, Philby was in Washington where he was in charge with SIS cooperation with the CIA. In April 1951, a month before the air-drop of the two groups in Ukraine, there was a large SIS-CIA conference dedicated to the Ukrainian liberation movement. Philby gained all the information about both groups who would be landing in Ukraine. Okhrymovych and Matviejkó were arrested by the Soviet secret service because of his reporting.

**Double-deal-agent** were believed to be trusted by counterintelligence agencies but actually acted in favour of the enemy of the Soviet state security agencies. The KGB authorities used double-deal-agents in exceptional cases, those who were recruited from among foreigners or from members of the anti-Soviet groups and organizations to misinform the enemy.

*Example.* In 1941 the OUN ordered Liudmyla Foja to conduct propaganda among the population along with being a liaison. Subsequently, she produced propaganda materials, collected medicine and funds for the UPA’s needs in Volhynia.

At the end of January 1944, she was arrested by the NKGB. For two months she was arrested and eventually was forced to collaborate with the NKGB — she became an agent with the pseudonym “Aprielskaya”.

In the summer of 1944, Liudmyla Foja, working for the NKVD, participated in the creation of a
pseudo-OUN Leadership in the East. It was ordered to discover the true underground and lure underground groups from western Ukraine into the arms of the NKVD.

Foja went to Volhynia together with an NKVD agent — Nina Kaliuzhna. During an interrogation by the OUN SB (Security service), she disclosed her orders and all the NKVD plans. “Aprielskaya” was re-recruited by the OUN SB and the NKVD agent, Nina Kaliuzhna, was liquidated.

Next, the OUN SB used Foja for their operational games against the NKVD. She returned several times to Kyiv and gave the NKVD fictitious reports about her “work”. The NKVD believed her to be a valuable agent.

In October 1945, she again left to Volhynia, but this time with NKVD agent Kateryna Mankivska. She gave the agent up to the OUN SB, where she was liquidated, and Foja finally moved underground.

The NKVD did not believe in their failure for a long time, and only in the end of August 1946 they declared an All-Union warrant for Foja.

**State Security Agencies Agent** agreed to carry out secret orders of the KGB authorities. This cooperation and the nature of their missions were to be kept a secret.

Such agents identified, warned and stopped espionage, terrorists, sabotage and other “hostile” intelligence operations, subversive ideological centers of the capitalist states and foreign anti-Soviet institutions and citizens abroad. They were used for ensuring the preservation of state secrets and military secrets of the Armed Forces of the USSR, on particularly important industry, transport and communications objects.
Example. The Ukrainian Bohdan S. ("Etien", “Bohdan”) was a trusted KGB person until 1967 when he became an agent. One of his tasks was to get needed information for the KGB on the French-woman Jeannette-Régine S. In 1966, she was visiting the Uk.SSR, and attracted the attention of the KGB.

The following year, “Bohdan” was sent to her as he had relatives in France and spoke French. In order to complete his assignment, he had to attract the French woman and enter into intimate relations with her. The file has code named “Courtesan” — one of the few examples of Soviet sex-espionage.

In order to get compromising material on Jeannette S., the intimate relations between “Courtesan” and “Etien” were filmed. For this, they met in an apartment which was equipped with special equipment.

Frontline Agent conducted reconnaissance, counterintelligence, sabotage and other tasks along the front lines in enemy-occupied territory.

The Cheka used frontline agents in 1918 in the rear of the White Guard troops. During the Second World War, the state security authorities had their own people in the intelligence-sabotage and counter-intelligence agencies and schools of Nazi intelligence, police forces and so on.

Example. Yakiv Kozlov (“Bohun”) headed the special group in the 4th directorate of the NKGB which operated in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. According to his testimony,
the Kozlov group blew up 19 military echelons, destroyed 6 strategic railway bridges. In the spring of 1945, along with the “Fakel” sabotage unit, which was made up of 18 fighters, they parachuted in near the city of Prague.

In April 1945, “Bohun” captured (and in fact stole from a commander of another special group) Major-General Fyodor Truhin, the Chief of Staff of Andrey Vlasov.

In 1945, Koslov arrived in Kyiv in his own car and brought with himself 8 kg of gold and silver, 5 suitcases of looted goods. Hlavk redirected this paratrooper, along with his group, to rest in Lviv.

There they held so-called “farm operations”: robbing people in nearby villages and killing eight civilians. The patience of the Kyiv NKVD leadership finally broke down. By that time, they had already collected enough compromising evidence on their “hero” and opened a criminal file. Ko-
Volodymyr Birchak

Zlov sat behind bars for a half of year. At the same time, his accomplices were jailed for 8 years.

Another interesting aspect of Yakov Kozlov’s biography was his work as an inter-cell agent in Kyiv, Lviv and other prisons. In particular, he “cultivate” the OUN leader of Odesa, Mefodii Pavlyshyn (“Matwiy”), the personal secretary of Andrej Sheptytsky, Father Ivan Kotiv, the UPA member Denys Ordynets, Mykola Duzhyj and others.

In 1946, Kozlov decided to actively fight with the nationalists in the Chernivtsi region. He tried to penetrate the OUN underground, tried to gain the trust of the OUN leader in Bukovyna, Vasyl Savchak (“Stal”) and kill him. But this operation ended fatally for “Bohun”: after an interrogation of the OUN SB, Kozlov was shot by the SB and as a consequence, the Chernivtsi MGB office lost their agent and SB began to play their own game.

The KGB also identified other agent categories: route agent, intelligence agent of a capitalist state, special agent, transporter agent, agent-provocateur, radio-agent, liaison agent, agent-installer, recruiting agent, agent-spotter, illegal agent, agent-confidante, holder of confidential apartment.

**Recruiting Agents**

In order to ensure cooperation with state security agencies, people had to be recruited. Sometimes, it happened compulsively — under the pressure of compromise, threats to the person or was blackmailed with the life and health of their relatives. More effective was the work of agents who volunteered to collaborate for ideological or selfish reasons.
Recruitment Agent — is a complex measure of state security bodies aimed at involving a person in secret cooperation with them while performing reconnaissance or counter-intelligence tasks.

At the preparatory stage, when selecting candidates for recruitment, all information available to the intelligence services was studied, as well as all possible official information from various Soviet institutions and organizations. Operatives check their files whether a person is not already an agent and works for another unit. They evaluated the candidate’s ability to obtain necessary information. They considered all available compromising information: one could be recruited now but what, in the future, could complicate the work of such an agent. Comprised individuals could be concealing their social origin or convictions of family members for political crimes, marital treason, corruption, abuse of office, unlawful gain, etc. A generalized psychological characteristic of the recruiting candidate was made, which evaluated their abilities as a potential agent. After that, the operative either received or did not receive permission to carry out the recruitment from a senior officer.

Here is a striking example of the recruitment of the wives of prominent cultural figures. These types of agents included Yuliya Solntseva — the wife of director Alexander Dovzhenko and Maria Sosiura — wife of poet Volodymyr Sosiura.

Volodymyr and Maria were married in 1931. Their life was violently scandalous, with loud family outbursts. Many times Maria would yank out a book from her husband’s hands saying: “They don’t pay you to do that! Sit — and write!”

Sosiura learned that Maria was an NKVD agent and had to inform on him and his friends in 1942, but did not
leave her. By 1948, Maria could no longer handle it and wrote a letter to Oleksandr Korniychuk, the chairman of the Union of Writers of Ukraine. She admitted that she was recruited in 1941 and forced to “work” in visiting secret apartments and because of this people thought of her as who-knows what. She asked Korniychuk to “dispel this gossip”. The head of the UWU, sent his letter “where he should” and in 1949 Maria Sosiura was sentenced to 10 years for disclosing state secrets. She was sent to Kazakhstan. She broke up with Volodymyr Sosiura before her arrest.

A year after Stalin’s death, Maria returned. In 1955, she and Volodymyr were officially married. Maria survived Volodymyr for 30 years, dying in 1995.

**Operational approach** — the next stage of recruitment, which consisted of actions necessary to recruit a new agent.

The procedure was greatly simplified if during the preparatory stage of recruitment, it was found that the candidate was inclined to voluntarily cooperate with state security bodies.
In other cases, when the preliminary analysis identified that recruitment would need to use compromising materials, psychological pressure and severe threats of life, all available means were used.

A typical scenario began with connecting a candidate with an absolutely innocent contact. The person was not to suspect any of this or whom they were dealing with. If necessary, at the appropriate moment, circumstances were artificially created for an operational approach. This could be a run in with the police, a sudden deterioration of affairs at work and so on. Often, the operatives used existing life circumstances: offering to help in the qualitative treatment of family members, to assist in entering higher education, to provide career advancement. For such assistance, the candidate had to cooperate with state security bodies.

At the same time, the operative would report that authorities “knew everything” and provided the candidate with this compromising information. They did not forget to remind the candidate about the consequences, if they refused. The KGB officers offered the candidate a statement for this secret cooperation and promised to keep it in strict secrecy. The conversation was based on psychological pressure, manipulation and intimidation.

When the candidate refused to cooperate after this, this was considered a failed operation. The operative could be prevented from working with agents, or transferred to others, not related to the recruited, who he had previously recruited.

In the case of a positive recruitment result, having received a written request from the candidate, the operative gave him information about the time and place of the next
meeting, reminded them of the importance of secrecy and briefly instructed them about espionage behaviour.

The next meeting usually took place after a week or two. In this way, the newly-awarded agent managed to recover from their stress, think about their new position, get used to it and accept the idea that there was no other way out. For the most valuable agents of the time, the operatives carried out surveillance with the help of the special services. Then they studied and evaluated the agent, checking the materials collected during the preparatory stage of recruitment.

The work of the agent was associated with constant stress, psychological discomfort and danger.

The operative directed the work of the agent — he set the tasks and made sure of their execution. He, in KGB terminology, “brought up” the agents: helped them, monitored their work, talked with them. The operative constantly focused on the purposefulness of his ward’s tasks, mutual trust, and preservation of strict secrecy, agreement of all actions which could lead to failure or dispersion. Everyone emphasized the importance of the agent’s work, the value of their information (even if there was not any), the importance of being involved in the work of the state security agencies.

Examples where people were forced to become agents of the state security agencies were quite frequent and sometimes took on a mass character.

**Example.** After the so-called Lviv Pseudo-Synod of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in 1946, when many priests who renounced their faith and converted to Orthodoxy, they were often recruited as agents of the Soviet secret service.

The OUN Security Service detected such agents and, as an example, showed civilians the deceit of the repressive
bodies. To this end, they developed a special disclaimer on behalf of such priests:

“I, ... the priest in the village of ..., was forced by the NKGB terror to sign an application to serve in the NKGB as a secret agent. As an honest man, I see that in a moment of spiritual weakness, I completed this crime before God and my people, and hereby give my vow that I will try to correct my shameful deed with devoted work for the people.

After experiencing difficult moments, entangled in the NKVD’s nets and knowing of their diabolical methods, as a Ukrainian and priest, I will warn my flock and all citizens before the abyss, which is being prepared by the Stalinist imperialist-thievery authorities and their criminal NKGB.

Creating a reproach over the church and faithful, the criminal NKGB used terror to force almost all the priests in my area to become agents and to bring in their flock.

I, like other priests, am entrusted with such awful work.

1. Follow and report on other priests.
2. Watch and report on my parishioners.
3. Asked parishioners during confession and betray these confessions to the NKGB.
4. To preach sermons for the criminal Stalinist authorities and to slander the people’s struggle against it”.

However, many agents were loyal servicemen of the repressive authorities, for which they repeatedly received monetary awards, promotions up the career ladder, received privileged status in society and so on.

An example of such a dedicated agent was already mention: Kateryna Minkovska (“Eugenia”), who, according to orders of the MGB, participated in operational games with the OUN SB.

Minkovsky was already working for the benefit of the GPU in the USSR in 1927 under the pseudonym “Eugenia”. In 1944, she was awarded the Order of the “Red Star” for the successful infiltration of the nationalist underground. In particular, as a result of “Eugenia’s” participation in the “Karpaty” operation, 75 OUN members were arrested. In the summer of 1945, she participated in creating the legendary OUN structures in the Konotop region of the Sumy oblast.

On 22 September 1945, Minkovsky left for Lutsk, as a representative of the Kyiv pseudo-center of the OUN underground to talks on the creation of an Interim Ukrainian Government in the Underground. The next day, she along with Liudmyla Foja, moved to a forested ar-
eas in the north of Lutsk, where “Eugenia” was detained, and after her interrogation was executed by the OUN SB.

Occasionally, those arrested, including representatives of the resistance movement, deliberately asked for cooperation in order to be released. And when they found themselves in freedom — either cut all contacts with the secret service or did not provide them with information or deliberately misinformed them.

**Example.** On 1 April 1946, Omelian Poliovyi, commander of the UPA “Lysonia” Military District, was detained by employees of the state security agencies. After a series of interrogations, the leadership of the state security authorities of the Lviv oblast informed the Uk.SSR MVD about his arrest and recruitment as a secret agent of the UMVD of the Lviv oblast under the pseudonym “Virny”.

However, the operatives noted in their reports that Poliovyi did not offer any real cooperation. So, at one of their meetings in June 1946, he was arrested again. Subsequently, he was sentenced to be shot, which was replaced with 25 years in concentration camps. Poliovyi was released only in 1971.

Also, the participants of resistance movement sometimes joined the agent-militant groups, and from there escaped back into the underground.

**Example.** Luka Hrynishak (“Dovbush”), UPA sotnyk, commander of the “Beskyd” kurin of the UPA “Hoverla” Military district, the OUN district commander for Nadvirna re-
region (1949–1950), used this scheme. As the Chekist reported in their documents: “Dovbush” — Hrynishak Luka Mykhailovych, born in 1918, head of the SB of the Nadvirna region of the OUN “Leadership”, captured 15 September 1951. On 3 January 1952, during a Cheka-military operation, he again fled into hiding.

“Dovbush” became the hero of Taras Khymych’s film “Zhyva” (2016).

In this section, we reviewed the main points of agent activity used by the repressive authorities. The value of agents’ reports and messages as a source of information would be analyzed in another section, devoted operational files.

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Operational Materials

During the great purges of the 1990s, provoked by the Velvet Revolutions in Eastern Europe, a significant part of the operational materials in the Soviet Union was destroyed.

However, more operational materials were saved than agent cases. These documents avoided destruction due to them being part of special operations or having historical or cultural value. And sometimes, materials were saved as a coincidence of circumstances.

Oleksandr Dovzhenko’s file was accidentally preserved, despite the conclusions of one of its workers: “I recommend destroying this file, as it has no historical or cultural value”. But this conclusion was not approved by his immediate supervisor, and at the place of the “senior operations officer” signature, the supervisor corrected it to “senior operations idiot”.

There was a large array of intelligence and operational materials stored in the regional SBU archives in Donetsk and Luhansk until 2014. However, due to the war with Russia, these materials were captured by terrorists and are currently unavailable.

In the Branch State Archives of the SSU in Kyiv, as well as some regional archives, operational materials are stored in fonds of operational-search and lettered files.
The fonds contain documents from 1917 to the end of the 1980s. These are results of the operative-search or counter-intelligence collection of information about people, groups, institutions, various industrial objects. Information in these files was extracted by the Cheka-KGB authorities through agents, secret agents, and with the help of secret surveillance and operational documenting (tapping, photo/video surveillance, opening and inspecting correspondences, etc.). Therefore, the operational materials contain a lot of valuable information for researchers.

In these fonds, you can find documents in the following areas:

**Detection and termination of subversive activities of foreign security services by state agencies:**

- countering the subversion of the special services of foreign countries by legal methods — through diplomatic missions, academic and cultural exchanges, humanitarian organizations;
Volodymyr Birchak

➢ detection of agents of foreign secret services and termination of their subversion by state security bodies;
➢ detection and termination of smuggling and illegal currency transactions.

Documents on the Ukrainian national movement of 1920’s–1930’s:
➢ agent files, operational cultivation files on figures of the Ukrainian national statehood struggle of 1917–1920, leaders of the insurgent movement;
➢ formulary files on Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Mykola Bazar, Serge Lifar, Platon Maiboroda, Andriy Malyshko, Volodymyr Sosiura, Maksym Rylsky, Pavlo Tychyna, Yuri Yanovsky and others.

Documents on the Ukrainian liberation movement during the Second World War (1939–1945) and the post-war period:
➢ working agent files, files of operational cultivation against the leaders of the UPA and OUN underground: Vasyl Bey, Vasyl Halasa, Dmytro Klyachkivsky, Roman Kravchuk, Uliana Kriuchenko, Vasyl Kuk, Dmytro Mayivsky, Vasyl Okhrymovych, Vasyl Sydor, Roman Tuchak, Petro Fedun, Roman Shukhevych, Richard Jary (documents of punitive bodies, original underground documents — leaflets, brochures, postcards, working recordings of detained or killed underground members, their photographs);
➢ files to various links to the OUN and UPA, including the OUN leadership in Ukraine (“Berloga”), the Lviv regional leadership (“Propast”), Zolochiv district leadership (“Yama”), etc.;
Operational Materials

- search files of members of the OUN and UPA and other anti-Soviet organizations that existed in 1939–1960;
- working files on agents, files of group operational cultivation against the leaders of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (Yosyf Slipy and others), members of sects, etc.

**Lettered Files:**
- On the intelligence and counter-intelligence, sabotage and punitive organs of Nazi Germany, its allies and accomplices from Soviet citizens who acted in the temporarily occupied territory of the Ukrainian SSR during the Second World War;
- Intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies of the USA, England, Germany, France, Italy, Israel and other states;
- On measures taken to protect the country’s economy.

There are several types of operational materials.
Operational Files

The operational files contain agent-operational and other documents that reflect the organization and results of counter-intelligence activities in various forms, as well as lines (church, academia, production, transport, education and so on) and objects (plants, factories, universities, schools, societies, creative groups, etc.). They are divided into group operational cultivation files, operational cultivation files, investigative files, operational observation files, operational verification files and lettered files.

**Group operational cultivation files** were initiated during the investigation of hostile (for the Soviet state) activities of a group of people. Such files concerned those who were suspected of espionage or other hostile activity and had credible evidence of this. These could be Soviet citizens and foreigners who permanently lived in the USSR, or lived in “capitalist countries” and arrived in the USSR for a short time.

**Example.** In order to neutralize the most active and interconnected “nationalist elements” involved in the distribution of samizdat in the Ukrainian SSR, the KGB began to develop a special operation codenamed “Block” in the summer of 1971. The party leadership issued appropriate instructions.

During the course of the operative-search activities, Ivan Svitlychny, Ivan Dziuba, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Sergiy Paradzhanov, Vasyl Stus, Yevhen Svertsiuk and many other Ukrainians, who lived in different cities, came under the scrutiny of the state security agencies.

The KGB agents discovered connections of participants with democrats in Moscow who were involved in the pro-
duction of the uncensored almanac “Chronicle of Current Events” and the activities of the “Initiative Group for the Protection of Civil Rights in the USSR” during “Block”. They also allegedly established contacts with certain “Jewish nationalists” and “Crimean Tatar autonomists” to create a mass opposition movement in the USSR.

The special Uk.SSR KGB operation “Block” lasted fifteen years — the last of its documents was dated in 1986. The case consisted of more than 200 volumes and was destroyed in 1990–1991. The KGB reports to the party leadership, which they created daily on what was happening in the country, are left — the quintessence of all denunciations, interrogation protocols, etc. There are about 700 reports in this case.

**Operational Cultivation Files** were built up against individual citizens, who were suspected of being part of an espionage ring or other hostile activities. The persons involved could be Soviet citizens and foreigners who permanently resided in the USSR, and those who came to the USSR from “capitalist countries” for a short time.

**Investigative File** began with those who hid from persecution of Soviet authorities — who they considered terrorists, saboteurs, traitors to the homeland, punishers as well as participants of the resistance movement, agents of imperialist intelligence and emissaries of foreign anti-Soviet organizations.
Example. In 1944, the Uk.SSR NKGB launched a large-scale operation codenamed “Berloga” to find members of the OUN Leadership and in particular, Roman Shukhevych. In order to find the Leader, they launched operation “Vovk” on 31 October 1945. There were 700–800 operatives involved in this operation. The information about the end of “Vovk” was received three time, every time this was inaccurate and therefore the search continued until 5 March 1950.

Operational Observation Files were created on “especially dangerous state criminals”, who had served their sentences and could be of interest to the enemy, as well as those who worked for the enemy previously.

Example. The repressive system did not leave the former underground members alone. After living through the GULAG camps, they continued to be “re-educated” by the party and the KGB. For this, a special Fifth Directorate of the KGB was created in July 1967. Initially, it was supposed to have a small composition but in 1983 there were 15 divisions in the Directorate structure with an extremely diverse field of activity. The Fifth Directorate oversaw religion organizations, dissidents, activities of foreign “ideological-subversive centers” in the USSR, students and teachers, non-governmental organizations, creative unions, trade unions, creative cooperatives, sports organizations, ideological-informational work among citizens, rockers, soccer fans, punks... And this is not even a complete list.
The “re-education” of the former underground members also belonged to the competence of the ideological subdivision. And these included: as an example, in the Lviv oblast there were 21,296 residents who were involved in underground activities as of 1 February 1981. Of these, 9,632 insurgents, the rest — “bandit accomplices” and special settlers.

Formulary Files were opened for individuals who were suspected of subversion against the USSR. After 1954, the term was replaced with “operational verification files”.

The Operational Verification Files were brought against a person or group of Soviet citizens or foreigners and stateless persons, permanently residing in the USSR and if they were receiving materials which gave reason to suspect them of hostile activity against the Soviet Union, but needed verification.
Example. A well-known Ukrainian historian and the Head of the Central Rada, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, immediately after his return from the émigré back to Ukraine in March 1924, fell under the total control of the Chekists, and a formular case was brought against him.

Subsequently, the Bolshevik special services sought to present him as the leader of the underground “Ukrainian National Center” organization. In order to do this, his formular file was fabricated with numerous agents reporting on Hrushevsky’s leadership role in this non-existent organization. There are more than 40 of these reports in only the first two volumes of his formular file.

A page from Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s formular file

Lettered Files were maintained by lines and areas of counter-intelligence work or by certain objectives. Firstly, lettered files were built up depending on the amount and local features of work by one line or another. They includ-
ed files of the struggle against the American intelligence, Ukrainian and other nationalists, anti-Soviet elements, religious figures etc.

Example. The “Control K” lettered file concerned the sabotage-intelligence organization of the German National Socialist Party, which acted under the guise of the “Control K” firm. On 15 October 1933, a memorandum was sent to Stalin that in Mariupol and Mykolaiv such an organization was revealed and partially liquidated.

The cells and residents of this organization were disclosed in a number of defence works factories, in ports and military units. The investigation established that German intelligence was supposedly handed over the recipe for armor steel, information on defence works, information about submarines, torpedoes, and other warships. Twenty-eight people were arrested in this case.

By the objects, the lettered files were brought against the most important departments, industries, enterprises, academic institutions, rail and water services and enterprises, military and other objects which were or could be of interest to foreign intelligence.

Example. Lettered File No. 231 “On the organization of counter-intelligence work in the Construction Department of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and subcontracting construction-installation organizations” was launched on 17 October 1972 in the town of Prypyat by the KGB. This was due to an increase in the volume of construction and installation work at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Counter-intelligence activities during the construction of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and in the town of
Prypyat were aimed at finding illegal agents, former members of the OUN and UPA, people convicted of particularly dangerous state crimes; preventing sabotage from foreign intelligence and hostile elements. They also took care of protecting economic security of the enterprise, investigating emergency situations. Instigators of anti-social manifestation at work were carefully searched for.

The most interesting operational materials are the agent reports. They are unique as they convey a direct perception of reality by people who often did not suspect that their behaviour, conversations or even thoughts (in letters and diaries) were being tracked.

Special services gained global information which covered various aspects of social and political life. This was evidenced by a significant number of clandestine assistant-agencies of the state security agencies, their composi-
tion, tasks performed, as well as ways and means of collecting information.

Secret agents recruited by staff members of the repressive authorities formed an **agents network**. Residents, owners of confidential apartments or contact points and informants also belonged to this network.

**Secret informants** watched everything — if there were “counter-revolutionary elements” or cases of sabotage, or facts of duty position abuse for anti-Soviet purposes, if tasks assigned to that institution are accomplished. They informed on the reaction of the population to a wide variety of issues — from discussing the decisions of the Central Committee during a party congress to rumours about a local catastrophe, tragedy or airplane crash. For conspiracy purposes, these informants were kept as inactive opponents of Soviet power, while at the same time, they tried to establish close contacts with the administration through trust. The operatives analyzed the information received from the informants and, on its basis, formed the tasks for more skilled secret agents.

**The agents** wrote the reports themselves and signed their pseudonyms with the date. It was strictly forbidden to make any changes to the messages of the secret employees. Occasionally, they could include reports compiled by

The cover of Bohdan Stashynsky (Stepan Bandera’s assassin) agent file
an operating officer according to the agent’s verbal information.

Very often, the repressive authorities recruited agents from close friends and relatives of people who interested them. Such agent reports are very valuable as when one communicates with friends and relatives, they usually tell the most intimate, shared thoughts and experiences about current events.

For example, for agents reports to the GPU on the so-called “UCPists” (representatives of the Ukrainian Communist Party) the agent took advantage of an intimate situation:

“On 12 June 1927, on Sunday (on the Trinity), I had to go for a walk into the field with one girl [...], she and I settled down under one curly bush in the shade and began to talk amongst ourselves.

Knowing well that this citizen was once the daughter of a large-scale farmer — landowner, German, who at one time had more than a hundred labourers, exploiting them for their profits [...], I decided to start a conversation with her on the topic of “a government coup” wanting to find any ridiculous Menshevik news, and maybe even rumours that are dangerous to the authorities.

I started the conversation with different approaches, posed myself as a student of a “cadet corps” about which I had not idea, suggesting to her that if not for the revolution, I would be some kind of governor, and the revolution prevented this for me and I hate it.

With these words, my Liza’s cheeks burned like fire and her eyes flashed. She hugged me tightly around the neck, kissed me and said: “I have found at least one person who suits me in every way”. 
Yes, I thought to myself, I finally caught you. Go further [...]. “Vanya — she says — if you love me, as I you, I will tell you one means through which we can get rid of the Soviet government and the Commune”.

I trembled more than ever, my heart was turning to stone. The mug who recently kissed me, became ugly [...]. But then came to my senses due to the difficult international situation and the bandit atrocities of the imperialists, starting with the murder of com. Vorovsky and the end of Voinov, I decided to take a calm approach, playing the role of a sympathetic counterrevolutionary.

I heard: “You know, Vanya, there is one organization here that has correspondences with foreign countries. There are good guys there. They invited me there, but I’m afraid. The organization is punitive [...]”.

It is obvious what happened with Liza after communicating with the man-agent, who received rewards for this important operational information.

**Rewards for information gathering** is an important study in the intelligence reports. According to them, it was possible to draw conclusions about the regularity, periodical and size of payments. In the materials on the personal agent files, a record of the rewards to a secret officer were contained. Department instructions recommended to take a receipt from the agent upon the receipt of money. In the accounting records, the amount of remuneration and the time of its issue was noted. The receipts were not added to the cases.

On the one hand, the future reward encouraged the agent to work more intensely and better. And on the other hand — the agent sometimes falsified operational informa-
tion and filed it with a member of the repressive authorities in order to receive money. The information received from the agent was to be checked and compared with other operational information by the Cheka-KGB worker. However, sometimes this was impossible to do.

There were a lot of factors that affected the agent reports: personal qualities of the agent, his/her views, relations with others, etc. Often, personal information of the informer is present in the reports.

Here is an example, when the agent did not transmit valuable information to the operative, but tried to protect himself and their family from the villagers’ revenge.

“For Your information, that a citizen of the village of Pryvilia, Kharytyina Lionova, wife of Ivan Lionov, is a counterrevolutionary, sometime on 13 May 1921, she argued to my mother that the communists were sons of bitches, who only rob and steal from the peasants and then she argued that if the bandits come, they would raze them to the ground in two twos, she said, that if they still come to arrest her husband, then she’ll blow my husband’s head off. So please take note”.

It should be noted, that the agent reports, where personal factor is included, are rather subjective sources and hold little confidence.

Often, agents worked for state security agencies by coercion and gave inaccurate or incomplete information, or tried to avoid cooperation.

Also, it often occurred that agents deliberately confused their Cheka-KGB leadership and played their own game or acted upon a planned underground special operation against the Soviet secret services. However, many agents were truly devoted to their work with the repressive author-
Heresies and deliberately, and sometimes with zeal, betrayed their friends, relatives and loved ones.

In order to separate the truthful from false information in intelligence reports, one can use the same methods and tools as dissecting archival and investigative materials.

**Perlustration of correspondence** was another means of obtaining information necessary for the repressive authorities. All international and incoming internal correspondences were subject to mandatory review. These documents are also a source of information.

Due to this perlustration, the state security agencies seized materials for the Cheka-KGB operational cultivations and confiscated letters which contained state secrets or had a counter-revolutionary character.

An example of the “counterrevolutionary” memorandum is an extract from a report by the head of the 2nd Special Section of the NKVD of the Uk.SSR Ivan Kuritsyn to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Uk.SSR Ivan Serov from 3 January 1941, in which he quoted a letter from Drohobych:

“...My dear and lovely brother. I will describe my life to you. The Bolsheviks have named their part of Poland Western Ukraine, under bayonets forced all the people to vote that they want to belong to Russia and announce to the whole world that people have asked to join Russia with pleasure and voluntarily.

This is a terrible outcry, injustice, terror and coercion committed by violence against the poor and defenseless people. The Bolshevik
and communist authorities are terrible and horrible. In songs and newspapers, propaganda boasts to the whole world that there is freedom, joy, happiness and well-being, and there is no such poverty and bondage in the whole world as under the tortuous Bolsheviks.

All power is in the hands of the Jews, all rely on great slander and lies, there is no mercy, pity and justice. The Bolsheviks say that it is a working-peasant power, and here there are only Jews in power, and above the workers, above the peasantry and in general spying by henchmen.

If all these states would converge on Russia and would bring about the will of the people and liberation from the Bolshevik yoke. That would be a merit from God and the rest of the world.

Here the people oppressed by the Bolsheviks are only waiting for such a kindness, for someone to begin a fight with Bolshevik Russia, then all here would rise up and help and that whole Bolshevik Red Army itself would turn into a white one.

If we were to throw off the yoke and oppression of those Red executioners from all over Russia. I ask you to have this letter read to your parish by the provost priest, and go to the committee of Polish organizations (village of Treinets. 210 Mostyska powiat, Drohobych oblast, Mykhailyna Korotek)."

Another example is the informational report of the head of the KGB of the VR of the Uk.SSR Vitalij Nikitchenko on the results of the perlustration of letters of Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia on 30 October 1968.

“...Counterrevolutionaries have managed to occupy leading positions before us. Here, they still make promises and continue their work."
In the most reliable places there are contras. In schools, institutes, teachers and professors teach pupils and students slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union, on socialism, and this shaggy youth willingly believes them.

The counterrevolutionary has not yet ended, this situation remains tense, the contra is a fascist beast here...”

It should be noted, that the material of the perlustrated correspondence is a fairly reliable source since its authors did not mostly suspect that their letters were being read.

External surveillance materials are also important research materials.

**EXTERNAL SURVEILLANCE** (Rus. naruzhnoye nabliudeniye, “naruzhka” or NN) — is the tacit measures of monitoring the behaviour and actions of people on the street, in public places or in transport. It was carried out by intelligence officers of the external surveillance services of the KGB or agents tasked by operational units.

In 1961 a separate specification was provided — **VISUAL SURVEILLANCE (VN)**. Alongside this, normal **SURVEILLANCE** remained (N). The “N” service installed equipment for phone-tapping any object — from apartments to workrooms.

During the external surveillance, the state security authorities also conducted **OPERATIONAL-TECHNICAL MEASURES** — actions related to the tacit use of operational equipment.

- **Measure “D”** — conducting secret searches in an apartment, hotel room etc., of people who are under cultivation.
- **Measure “T”** — providing tapping of the surveillance object outdoors.
- **Measure “U”** — installation of special equipment (photo, video equipment) at an object where it is necessary
to have a secret recording of information.

- **Measure “N — Extra”** — installing a microphone control on an object for 6–8 hours.
- **Measure “M”** — tapping international lines of communication for no more than 20 days.
- **Measure “E”** — breaking into safes, suitcases for the purpose of extracting content, secret photography or perlustration.

- **Measure “EF”** — secret photography of compromising documentary material.
- **Measure “MT”** — perlustrating mail and control of object by chemical means. Chemical labels were applied to personal belongings and objects of everyday life. By touching these things, people transferred “tags” to their correspondence. Such letters were detected with the help of special equipment at post offices and taken to operational control.

However, some things manage to be missed even in such a meticulous observation.

*An example* here may be the last UPA Commander, Vasyl Kuk, who was released from custody but surveillance over him never stopped.

The Chekists wrote in their report:

“In the process of monitoring Kuk, a number of facts were recorded which give reason to believe that he could use his release from criminal responsibility and his stay in freedom to continue anti-Soviet activities and commit other crimes.”
With his arrival in Leningrad in 1965 and in Moscow in 1969 it was noted that he behaved suspiciously, used various tricks to detect surveillance. In both cases, he managed to escape from external observation and return uncontrolled to Kyiv”.

It should be noted, that the collected operational materials were always accompanied by extracts from official documents about the person’s lifestyle, activities, occupations, certificated from the places of their former work, place of birth and residence. All collected material was carefully reviewed. Such documents contain important biographical information for researchers.

When reviewing printed books, even the most loyal content, notes were made by the owners of the text and underscored. Analyzing the documents, written by hand, has resorted to a “calligraphic examination”.

Members of the OUN Leadership — Mykhailo Stepaniak, Vasyl Kuk and Petro Duzhy — after being released from prison, 1960s. Photo was taken by a hidden camera
As with the AIC’s, the operational materials sometimes involved materials of the intellectual activity of the person which was being developed by the repressive authorities (theoretical reviews on various academic issues, articles, manuscripts, original epistolary, draft resolutions of the party and Soviet bodies, etc.).

Often, the list of individuals who were of interest to the repressive agencies were categorized in relevant categories by the collected operational materials. For example, in the SBU archival system there are lists of police officers of the Second Polish Republic, gendarmeries and officers of prison authorities, former officials of the Russian imperial administration, monarchist organizations, people who were subject to deprivation of voting rights, repatriates and re-immigrants, members of paramilitary organizations who collaborated with the Nazi authorities, former White officers, etc.

This array of documents was isolated in a separate fonds, which is now stored in the SBU archival system under the title of “Collection of Printed Publications.” A more detailed description of such documents will be presented in the next chapter.

Sometimes in the operational material there are even inspections of all sorts of rumours. On this, the Cheka instructions noted: “Do not hold a biased opinion about the uselessness of using rumours. In no case is it impossible to ignore the latter, it is only necessary to carefully check every rumour and find its sources. Often the rumours may be from the causative of the agent of a criminal case”.

After the operational materials were sufficiently “filled” with criminal material on a person — the file was “realized.”
That is, they transferred it to the judicial or extrajudicial authorities, or built up investigatory files. On the basis of the information collection, people were compromised, discredited, recruited, arrested, filed a petition for expulsion, and so on.

It is worth noting, that the operational materials were presented at court hearings in exceptional cases. Particular attention was paid to the encryption of agents and an invitation to court of secret collaborators was strictly regulated.

The operational materials were sealed in a separate package and marked “Top Secret”, with a note that “Only the Chairman of the Court Session/Military Tribunal to Open” which was sent along with the investigative materials.

After the use of these documents, they were once again sealed and the envelope was attached to the file with a separate description. The defendant or their defence could only see the documents in extreme cases.

It should be noted, that the degree of reliability of information which operational materials contain is difficult to establish. When the material of the perlustrated correspon- dences is confirmed by excerpts from letters, the informa- tion from the agent reports largely depended on the subjec- tive perspective of the secret collaborators, their personal qualities or attitudes to the object under cultivation.

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Подкур Р., Ченцов В. Документы органов государственной безопасности УССР 1920–1930-х годов: источниковедческий анализ. Тернополь, 2010
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The array of documents of the Soviet repressive agencies is actually very large. In addition to the categories of files discussed in the previous chapters, there are also other documentary sources in the SBU archival system that can supplement the information already discovered and help verify and inspect this or that information or be an independent source.

The “Collection of Printed Publications” in the Branch State Archives of the SBU fonds and regional archives, as already noted, was created as a result of operative-search activity of the Soviet repressive bodies. This operative archive of the Uk.SSR KGB started it in December 1959, and it received documents until 1991. They relate to the history and activity of the state security agencies of the Uk.SSR, the USSR, the special services of foreign states and so on. The documents of the archival fonds of the subdivisions of the Central Office of the Uk.SSR KGB, which had expired their time in those department’s storages, also came here but the content they represent does have an academic and historical value. To these documents must be added also printed editions, manuscripts, lectures on the work of the special services, reference books, memoirs of veterans of the state security bodies, lists of people they searched or who they registered, award documents, etc.
In addition, the collection includes:

- indictments on the activities of the “counterrevolutionary organizations” in the USSR and the Uk.SSR. These materials were formed on the basis of the most indicative investigations conducted by the Cheka-KGB, and used in the training manuals for future Chekists;

- documents on the activities of the commissions investigating mass executions and burials of 1937–1941 in the Bykivnia Forest near Kyiv; political prisoners’ executions at the beginning of the German-Soviet war; the Katyn massacre and more;

- documents about the crimes of the Nazis on the territory of Ukraine during the Second World War;

- documents, extracted by state security officers in 1944-1955 from the killed and arrested of members of the Ukrainian liberation movement (ideological materials; guidelines and instructions of the OUN and UPA; reports; official, propaganda, educational and children’s publications; periodicals; postcards; flyers and leaflets; correspondence);


- educational and training literature from operational-investiga-
tive activities on the fight of the Chekists with Ukrainian, Belarussian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian liberation movements;

- collections of materials from the history of the agencies and troops of the VUCHK-GPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB of the USSR and Uk.SSR (“History of the Soviet State Security Organs”; “Soviet Military Counterintelligence”; “The Activities of the State Security Bodies of the USSR at the Present Stage”);

- publications on the history of the special services during the Russian Empire, the Soviet state security bodies, the special services of other countries.

**Informational-Analytical Documents** of the Soviet repressive bodies — numerous summaries, memoranda of the central and local authorities of the Cheka-KGB — are valuable to study because they contain important information about the political, socio-economic and cultural processes, which took place in Ukraine and in the world from 1917–1991, outlining specifics about the region, submitting characteristics of certain political and public figures, local party, Soviet and business leaders.

The state security organs prepared these materials for the highest political leadership, party and Soviet organs in the region. One can classify them as follows:

- affiliation: informational-analytical reports and summaries of the Central Office of the Cheka-KGB and their local departments;

Seals, which were used by the Ukrainian nationalists to forge documents
chronological: periodic reports of the central offices of the Cheka-KGB and their local authorities; single, tri, seven-day, ten-day, bi-weekly, monthly summaries of the local state security agencies;

subjectivity (extraordinary events, resonant issues, etc.).

It is clear that the informational-analytical summary has a subjective character, since the people who made their analysis of phenomena and events did not go beyond the ideological guidelines of the ruling party. However, this does not mean that the creators of such documents were inherently illogical, inadequately relying the perceptions of reality or were unreliable in their description of historical events. Despite their class prejudices, political views or conjuncture, the authors of this informational-analytical accounts reflect, at least, the reality in which they lived and described. Therefore, in trying to understand the essence or background of these historical phenomena, these sources should not be neglected.

The majority of informational-analytical reports are stored in the Secretariat of the Uk.SSR GPU-KGB fonds. Its origins can be fragmentally traced to 1930, while the detailed structure and functions
were established on 26 August 1952 and did not undergo dramatic changes until 1991. In this fonds are:

- minutes of meetings of the leadership of the GPU-KGB;
- guidelines and orientation of the GPU-KGB on operational issues;
- reports, special reports, certificates, operational reports on the fight against counter-revolutionary organizations, Ukrainian nationalist organizations, spy activity of foreign intelligence services against the USSR, reaction of the population to certain events of the Uk.SSR, USSR and the world;
- statistical reports on the course of repressive operations against “anti-Soviet elements”;
- statements on the state of the border guard of the USSR and operative servicing along the border;
- external investigations of foreign consulates;
- special reports and reports of road accidents and road traffic safety information, etc.

**The Personal Files Fonds of Former Employees of the State Security Agencies** (Cheka-KGB) date back to 1918 and also cover military personnel and freelance employees. The following are stored in the fonds of the Branch State Archives of the SBU:

- personnel files of former employees of the Central Office of the Uk.SSR Cheka-KGB;
- personal files of the former employees of the Ukrainian NKVD-KGB of the Uk.SSR in the Drohobych and Lviv oblasts, Kyiv and the metropolitan oblast;
- documents on the investigation of violations of duty committed by employees of the state security agencies of the Republic.
**Normative-Regulatory Documents** — this fonds contains orders, instructions, reports and materials of the colleges and meetings of the republican and Union level state security bodies. In Ukraine, documents of this type were practically not preserved from 1919 to the beginning of the 1930s. Instead, beginning in 1937, all types of normative-legal and administrative documents of the state security bodies of the Uk.SSR were stored.

This fonds includes:

- orders and instructions from the leadership of the state security agencies of the Uk.SSR (from 1921);
- orders and instructions from the leadership of the state security agencies of the USSR (from 1934);
- minutes of meetings, reports and decisions of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Uk.SSR KGB (from 1961);
- reports, instructions, reviews, orientation on lines and directions of operational activities, in relation to the personnel, and throughout the whole complex of activity of the state security agencies of the USSR (from 1946);
- reports, instructions, reviews, orientations on trajectories and directions of operational activity, in relation to the personnel, and throughout the whole of complex activity of the state security agencies of the Uk.SSR (from 1945).
Materials from the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB-KGB. This counter-intelligence structure was created in February 1941 within the Union and Republican bodies of state security. During the Second World War, it undertook active operational measures against the intelligence-subversive activities of the special services of Nazi Germany, its allies and other countries, conducted counter-intelligence work in the economy, especially on important objects of defensive value, searched for hostile agents, traitors, torturers and other government criminals.

The 2nd Directorate remained the leading counter-intelligence unit in the post-war period. In July 1959, it also subjected counter-intelligence work upon railways, sea and river transports, civil aviation and communications. And since 1967 — worked against the intelligence centers of NATO and other countries, searched for illegal international agents, provided operative support for trips of Soviet citizens abroad, protection of state secrets, counter-intelligence work in industry and transport.

The fonds includes:
- control and supervisory files on the operative work of the Ukrainian KGB in the oblasts under the 2nd Directorate;
control and supervisory files on the most important objects of the operative interest of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Directorate;

- documents on the termination of the intelligence-subversion work of foreign intelligence services;

- documents on the operational activities to infiltrate foreign intelligence agencies;

- documents of counter-intelligence security of the educational-economic complex and transport;

- documents of counter-intelligence investigations on Soviet citizens travelling abroad;

- files on the investigation of particularly dangerous criminals, members of the Nazi punitive bodies.

The **Materials of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Directorate of the KGB** were first created in September 1983 when the state security agencies were tasked with securing counter-intelligence of the MVD, military registration and enlistment offices, civil defence headquarters and military-construction units. For this purpose, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Directorate of the Uk.SSR KGB and relevant regional departments were formed. It was primarily concerned with the protection of these structures from enemy infiltration, providing reliable control over the preservation of state and military secrets, assisted the Ministry of Internal Affairs in maintaining good order and fighting crime.

**Material of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Directorate of the MGB-KGB.** Created in July 1946, this unit focused on preliminary operational cultivation against people suspected of hostile activity; operational measures to stop the attempts of enemy intelligence agents accessing secret units of state institutions, organizations, industrial enterprises and academic institutions; the search for authors and distributors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents.
Since 1950, the 5th Directorate also dealt with “anti-Soviet elements” among the clergy and sectarians. On 23 July 1959, it was merged with a counter-intelligence unit of the 2nd Directorate of the Uk.SSR KGB.

The following files are in this fonds:

- documents on operational searches, cultivations and investigations of people involved in the betrayal of the Soviet underground organizations on the territory of Ukraine occupied by the Nazis (1943–1948);
- operational correspondences into investigating extraordinary events on the territory of Ukraine in industry, water and air transportation, agriculture (1956–1959);
- materials from the correspondences of the Uk.SSR MGB about the struggle against “anti-Soviet elements” among the clergy and sectarians (1948–1951).

The Materials of the 6th Directorate of the KGB, created in 1982 contain a set of documents that reflect the functions of that unit, namely: operational protection of scientific and industrial objectives from foreign intelligence services; protection of secrets, exposure and prevention of sabotage and terrorist activities, prevention and investigation of extraordinary events, especially when it concerned explosives, fires, radiation and toxic hazards.

The fonds stores documents of the counter-intelligence support of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Materials of the 7th Directorate of the MGB-KGB. Created on 31 January 1950, this unit was engaged in external surveillance, identification, arrests and searches. It was repeatedly reorganized until 1960, but its main functions did not change. Subsequently, the 7th Directorate was on-
ly engaged in external surveillance while Arrest and Search Group was abolished. It lasted in this form until 1991.

**Materials of the 9th KGB Service.** This unit accomplished tasks of protecting and providing security for the members of the Central Committee Politburo of the CPSU and the Central Committee Politburo of the Communist Party of Ukraine, state and political figures of foreign countries, who were in Kyiv or the Uk.SSR as well as official events which took place in Ukraine with the participation of people who were protected by this service.

**Materials of the Directorate for Combating Banditry of the MVD, 2-N Directorate and 4th Directorate of the MGB-KGB:** this fonds includes documents of the units which were assigned tasks combatting the resistance movement of the OUN and UPA, as well as foreign centers of Ukrainian nationalists.

The Directorate for Combating Banditry (BB) of the NKVD (subsequently MVD) of the Uk.SSR was established on 17 March 1942. It was eliminated in March 1950. Criminal files and materials which were included in their proceedings, were transferred to the detective criminal unit of the MVD of the Uk.SSR.

In January 1947, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the government of the USSR decided to direct state security agencies against the fight with the OUN and UPA. The 2-N Directorate of the Uk.SSR was tasked with planning counter-insurgency operations against the anti-Soviet underground in western Ukraine. This functioned until 1954.

The 4th Directorate of the MGB of the USSR, created on 12 June 1946, primarily targeted the prosecution of state criminals, and from the early 1950’s — a struggle with the
OUN underground. Also, this unit was engaged in the search of employees and agents of foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies, individuals who collaborated with Nazi secret services during the Second World War, participants of punitive actions and massacres of civilians, police officers, employees of the German occupational administration, traitors to the homeland. On 9 March 1960, the 4th Directorate was disbanded, and its divisions were united with the 2nd Directorate of the KGB in the Uk.SSR.

The fonds includes:

- memorandums, special reports from regional departments of the Uk.SSR’s MGB on work results, operational measures and military operations against the OUN and UPA;
- daily, monthly and annual reports of the NKGB-MGB-KGB regional departments on combating the Ukrainian liberation movement in 1944-1954;
- trophy documents: instruction, protocols of meetings of the OUN leaders, orders of the UPA command, as well as the confessions of OUN functionaries seized by state security agencies about the activities of the OUN and UPA;
- operational cultivation of members of the central and regional OUN leadership;
- materials of the MGB fake radio messages with OUN centers abroad;
- reports of the seizure or liquidation of underground leaders and so on.
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http://resource.history.org.ua/item/0005698
List of Terminology

**Bandit** — this term was used by investigators and operatives for both members of anti-Soviet organizations or groups, and for members of actual criminal groups.

**Bandit Accomplice** — a person who helped anti-Soviet organizations or groups.

**Active Interrogation** — interrogation using physical and psychological methods of influencing the arrested person.

**Perlustration of correspondence** — secret reading of correspondences carried out in order to collect information; extraction of materials that could serve as the basis for an operational cultivation of the Cheka-KGB; confiscation of letters, which contain state secrets or which have “counterrevolutionary” character.

**Prevention** — conducting interviews with a person (persons) by the state security agencies, in order to persuade, intimidate or blackmail to induce them to the behaviour needed by the authorities.

**Political Article** — the 54th article of the Criminal Code of the Uk.SSR (58th article of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR respectively), which provided for the punishment of “counterrevolutionary activity” — activities against the Soviet system and the communist ideology (“betrayal of the Motherland”, “terrorist acts”, “assisting international bourgeoisie”, “espionage”, “armed uprising”, etc.).
“Enemy of the People” — a person convicted of a political article of the CC (the term existed in the Criminal Code of the Uk.SSR from 1927-1960).

“Seksot” (Rus. Secret employee) — a person recruited by the state security authorities to secretly carry out their tasks, primarily — gather information about the sentiments of individuals who are in the intelligence service fields; an “informer”.

Cultivation — comprehensive study of a person (group of people) by the state secret authorities for further arrest, prevention or conducting operational combinations.

“Naruzhka”, NN, external surveillance — secret measures to monitor the behaviour and actions of individuals who were under cultivation during their walk in the streets, in public places or when travelling which carried out by intelligence officers of the external surveillance services of the Cheka-KGB or by agents tasked by operational units.

“Proslushka” (Rus.: “eavesdropping”) — tapping of an apartment and/or phone or outdoors conversations with the help of operational equipment.

Confrontation — simultaneous cross-interrogation of two or more persons in order to compare their testimonies and eliminate contradictions between them.

Veshchdok (Rus.: Material evidence) — material evidence, material object (documents, photos, audio recordings, instruments of crime, etc.), which helps in disclosing a crime or advocating a prosecution.
**C/R ELEMENTS** (counterrevolutionary element) — people/organizations that the communist regime accused of hostile, anti-Soviet activity. The term is more typical for the 1920s-1950s.

**A/S ELEMENTS** (anti-Soviet elements) — the same as a c/r elements. The term is more characteristic of the second half of the XX century.

**Bourgeois nationalists** — from the point of view of the Soviet terminology — those who stand for the independence of their countries from the USSR or broad autonomy; or for the preservation of national identity and against the policies of national assimilation. The term was interpreted very widely for the persecution of those who did not support the official national policy of the USSR.

**Trotskyists** — in a narrow sense — followers of the communist revolutionary, later the Soviet party and statesman Leon Trotsky, who was in opposition to Joseph Stalin. During the Great Terror of 1937-1938, the term was used as a label for accusing one of the classes of “enemies of the people.”

**Abbreviations**

**VChK** (Cheka; *Rus.*: Vserossiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya) — All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution.

**(O)GPU** (*Rus.*: Obyedinyonnoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye) — (Joint) State Political Directorate.
**NKVD** (*Rus.:* Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del) — People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.


**MGB** (*Rus.:* Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) — Ministry of State Security.

**MVD** (*Rus.:* Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del) — Ministry of the Interior

**OSO** (*Rus.:* Osoboye Soveshchaniye) — Special Council.

**KGB under SM USSR/Uk.SSR** (*Rus.:* Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR/USSR) — Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR/Uk.SSR

**VMN** (extreme penalty; *Rus.:* Vysshaya Mera Nakazaniya) — synonymous with the highest measure of social protection (death penalty).

**UGB** (*Rus.:* Upravleniye gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti) — Directorate of State Security.

**KTR** (*Rus.:* katorzhnyye trudovyye raboty) — hard labour work.

**ITL** (*Rus.:* ispravitel'no-trudovyye lagerya) — correctional labour camps.

**RKM** (*Rus.:* Raboche-krest'yanskaya militsiya) — Workers-Peasants Militia.

**INO** (*Rus.:* Inostrannyy otdel) GPU — Foreign Department of the GPU.
how to read KGB documents
from archive to media
Otar Dovzhenko

media expert, co-editor of the online media “MediaLab”, Head of the Monitoring Center of the “Detector Media” NGO

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History is related to eternity, journalism deals with present. In order to convert historical research into journalistic material, an author has to accept the rules of media procedures and be open to compromises, so wider audience would understand the content. It is not about making down-to-earth or simplifying scientific and research text, but about its transition to a story telling from the past. It is about possibility to capture, entertain, and teach the contemporaries.

A journalistic text is not the same as the research. That is why one should not try to include all the information found when researching a topic. The content of your text (or a series of texts if you work on several non-related stories) has to contain only the most important and interesting facts. From the perspective of a historian, a journalistic text would always be incomplete and not deep enough in research. Even a journalist who is very immersed in the subject may think that he is required to simplify the story too much. This very superficiality, simplicity and generalization gives a chance to be heard by people who do not read historical works or visit archives personally.
Avoid using a scientific style. The journalistic material has to be written in a simple way, without specific terminology and complicated syntax. The National Geographic History Publishing uses the language that allows both curious school students and pensioners understand it. At the same time, vulgar conversational style inherent in the yellow press should be avoided either. When defining the style of your text, consider whether you would use the same vocabulary and style when telling your story to someone else. For example: The figure of Yevhen Konovalets is an important link in the continuity of the history of the Ukrainian liberation movement. He and his associates were among the first to embark on the path of realization of the idea of Ukrainian statehood and moved the Ukrainian society towards the path of liberation struggle. They inspired the next generation of the activists of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army by their activity (Istorychna Pravda — Historical Truth, www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2018/05/13/152450).

Indeed, we understand what the author wants to say. But is this the proper way of saying it in the given context? “The figure of Konovalets” is Konovalets himself. “Embarked on the path of realization of the idea” means they began to embody the idea (note that there are two “paths” in this sentence — “realization” and “liberation struggle”). It is unlikely that you ever seriously use the word “activity”. Then, why to use this way of communication with your reader? This is often done in order to provide the text of the celebration, to emphasize the importance of what is being discussed... But the effect is the opposite: a reader simply skips lines that does not carry the content load or he/she stops reading.
A JOURNALISTIC TEXT IS ALWAYS A STORY. It means that it has a plot and heroes.

Heroes can also be people who already passed away. You reproduce what happened to them, quote their words or documents that have their actions recorded or indicated their fate. About any phenomenon, any event from the past is better to be told through someone’s personal story. Speaking of an organization, community, institution and even country, never forget about the people who stood behind it.

The plot can be both a development of action (you describe what happened to the heroes), and the development of thought (you build a logic of reflections that helps understand the meaning of long past events). In both cases, the reader will gradually discover a story by learning something new.

IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT OF YOUR TEXT. Is it a person or event, is it the period of time at which this person acted or the event occurred, is it the process in which the person participated? Is the story narrated by the found documents and evidence quite typical? When writing, for example, about the repressed persons, who proved their innocence in the Soviet court, do not forget that it is rather an exception, not a rule. The fact is millions of others were not so lucky.

THE JOURNALIST TEXT IS NOT READ FOR LONG. This does not necessarily mean that you have to artificially reduce it by eliminating important things. It is important that the title of the text, the ice (subtitle) and the first two or three paragraphs are developed so they do not scare the reader but vice versa you want to drag the reader to further reading by presenting intrigue, paradox, and uniqueness of the story which will be developing further. Journalists are well aware
that they should do so with news, but often forget about updating the text, working with analytical and journalistic formats.

**First, the title draws the attention of a reader to the text.** No matter how genius and exclusive the material is, if the reader does not pay attention to the title, he/she may not read the text after. At the same time, one can not abuse the audience's attention by using scandalized headlines and misleading by them. For example, “The Secret of the Polubotok’s Gold Is Uncovered” can only be written in case it is true, but not when your text contains only hypotheses or versions.

Headings that are common to scholarly articles and research papers are absolutely not appropriate for journalistic materials. For example, the headlines from the site historians.in.ua “Violence in Architecture of the Twentieth Century Till Present: Finding Ways to Overcome” or “Memory of the Conflicts and Dialogues of the Poles with Neighbouring Peoples in the Cultural Landscape of Poland’s Capital” reveal the theme of the text (“about what?”). Instead, in the journalistic material the main task is to convey an idea, that is, “what do I want to say with this text?”

The title should correspond to the edition format you are preparing the material for. For example, in many online editions compilations of titles are standard. The first part is figurative or metaphorical attracting readers’ attention and intriguing, and the second one is more informative, revealing the actual subject of the text. Here are some examples from Istorychna Pravda:

- **The Frozen Past. Soviet Ukraine in the Arctic Ocean**
- **Pirates of the Dnieper Rapids. River War of 1919–1921**
How a Reporter Should Write About History

Colonel and Solitude. Personal Life of Yevhen Konovalets
Great Bluff. The Recruitment Campaign in the Galicia Division as Manipulative Technology

This is not the only possible header format in this edition. However, if you propose the editorial text under the title “Secrets of the Past” or “Heroes Do Not Die,” you should be prepared to ensure that the editor changes the title to the one that, in his opinion, will attract readers’ attention and display the meaning of the text more effectively.

A significant part of the audience of online publications comes from social networks where texts are displayed as snippets, i.e. icons that include a headline, subtitle (ice), and picture. Below is an example from Istorychna Pravda:

When Melanchton Leaves Luther’s Shadow
Reformation is not only Martin Luther himself. It also includes his students and followers. Many of them were extraordinary personalities who deserve acknowledgement and memory. One of them...

Even if this publication is visited by a professional audience that is purposefully interested in history, a picture
(cover of the book), a title and ice may cut off almost all random readers, except for those who are familiar with the name of Melanchton.

Here is another example:

Shy Authoritarianism

Why do Stalinists and Nazis deny the facts they are proud of?

Above is a pronounced cartoon with recognizable characters, an attractive title, and a question in the ice. A reader hopes to receive the answer to it in the material. You cannot always predict what will snipe your future material in social networks (it depends on the editor, layout and format of the publication, etc.). However, the finished text presented to the customer is the text with the title, the lead/subtitle, the logical beginning and closing.

The media workers call the first part of the text a nut graph (the “nuts” paragraph). It should reveal the content of the material and not to be so exhaustive or it might discourage people to continue reading.
Let's take a look at how the nut graph of Ivan Siyak's case material is made:

_Five years in Stalin's concentration camps were spent by a centurion of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) and commander of the Ukrainian People's Republic Army (UNR Army) Ivan Siyak. His life, along with more than a thousand other prisoners, broke the ball of NKVDist in the Karelian tract of Sandarmokh. After more than half a century, the secret archival file was revealed and taken over by his great-grandson and full namesake Ivan Siyak. In his family, his great-grandfather’s story, the story of a lawyer and active freedom fighter, was being retold as a family legend_ (Radio “Liberty”, www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28999555.html).

In this example, “lure” which should attract the audience’s attention is not only the figure of the hero, but also a reference to his family history. To use global generalizations and “lyrics” at the beginning of the text would be a mistake (e.g. “Ukraine has fought for its independence for centuries”, etc.). Start with a bright, strong, unusual, and paradoxical introduction. Choose some facts that would really catch readers’ attention. Such a beginning in English is called a kicker. In order to develop a habit of not starting your story with generalizations, it is useful to read quality English-language journals, ex. _The New Yorker_.

**THE READER USUALLY DOES NOT KNOW THE STORY.** For many, even for educated people, historical facts, names and dates have remained in the forgotten school curriculum (at professional and often even at the most general levels).

Keep in mind that the surnames of Sudoplatov, Azef or Horlis-Horsky do not tell readers anything; they do not know what was being discussed in the Third Universal of
the Central Council of Ukraine. General public knows only
the fact the Stalin's repression occurred. That is why **Absolutely Every Detail Must Be Explained**. For example, recalling
the NKVD and the NKGB, it is necessary not only to **Decipher The Abbreviations**, but also to explain what was done
by one and the other agency. However, abbreviations should
always be deciphered, except for the most well-known ones.
For the first time in the text one writes “All-Ukrainian Cen-
tral Executive Committee”, and then you can use the abbre-
viatio AUCEC.

This also applies to **Geographical Names**. If you write
about Sandarmokh, Solovki or Steplag, most readers will
not be able to imagine where and how far from home a pris-
oneer found himself. At best, for them all this territory is “Si-
beria”. Google maps give you the ability to create your own
map from the house of the character to the place of exile.
This will clarify real distance between destinations. If the
map in the material cannot be used, at least explain where
the mentioned place is located.

**Take into account the target audience for which you
are writing.** If readers are younger than 35, that is, they
were not born or were children at the time of the collapse
of the Soviet Union, they would have limited understanding
of the words “perestroika” and “putsch”, the last names of
Masol, Kravchuk or Yeltsin. The knowledge of these people
about the history of the second half of the twentieth century
is extremely mythologized and dotted. Instead, the older au-
dience may remain under the influence of Soviet propagan-
da myths or recent political propaganda.

**The use of initials in texts should be avoided.** This
practice, preserved from the Soviet times, is unacceptable
for modern media. The initials, instead of the names, de-
personalise and depreciate the people you are writing
about. For example: About “politics” and secularism in Het-
man Mazepa's anathema testifies at least the fact of Hetman
Ivan Skoropadskyi's letter to Kyiv Metropolitan J.Krokovskyi
(www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/post-mazepa/2280-an-
drij-bovgirya-getman-izmennik-konstruyuvan). From the let-
ter “J” before the name of the Metropolitan, the reader is un-
likely to guess which name he had (Joasaph).

If the surname leaves no doubt who it is about (Ber-
ia, Stalin, Bandera, etc.), it is quite enough to mention it.
In other cases first and last names should be used (Roman
Shukhevych, Severyn Nalyvaiko, etc.). An exception may
be a pseudonym, part of which is an initiate letter, such as
O. Henry.

**Documents are illustrations.** Referring to a scan co-
py of the interrogation protocol of your hero or newspaper
print from seventy years ago, you must realize that 95% of
readers will not dive into this text. They will just glance at
the text to see how it looks. If it is important for you to have
a document or part of it read, then quote the text. Howev-
er, keep in mind that readers are inclined to skip too long
quotes, so you should choose the most eloquent excerpt
while the rest of it is briefly retold.

When referring to or recalling the document, explain its
meaning and the status of the person who signed it. For ex-
ample, the words “**member of the OUN Home Executive and**
the ideological referent of the OUN” to an uninformed read-
ner will not say anything. It is of no interest what the men-
tioned person was engaged in the organization, which was
your character’s rank and status.
Reference to sources must be made. This will indicate the transparency of the text; readers will trust you as the author. If you are preparing the material for an online publication, immediately place a hyperlink. The WAS online magazine, one of the most popular publications on history of Ukraine, uses the traditional format for a list of literature for scientific publications in the end. This, though, is unnecessary. The absolute majority of readers will not use this list. References in square brackets in the text can disorient and divert attention. If your source can not be found on the Internet, it is enough to just name it (e.g., the historian writes such in a book with such a name ...).

Publications in the media are not facts. What we today call journalistic standards began to operate relatively recently, and only in democracies of Western countries. In the press of the first half of the twentieth century you might find misinformation, propaganda, giving the desired for a valid, false links, the use of rumors and assumptions, and the substitution of facts by estimates. Therefore, mentioning a certain event or fact in the media at that time should not be presented as a direct proof that everything was exactly the way it is presented. This is especially true of the press of totalitarian states and those periods when an armed conflict or political confrontation is taking place in the country.

A great example is the “Kharkiv Oldies” project www.starosti.com.ua which published newspaper prints form one hundred centuries ago. Now there is 1918 in the “Oldies”, Kharkiv once again moved from one authority to another, and you can make sure that the newspapers of the time published questionable (and probably censored) news: In the Kupyansk county after Bolsheviks left, there were various mil-
itary assets left at many stations, which some institutions express desire to take away. Measures have been taken to collect property in military warehouses. The Rylsk district commandant in the Kursk province informs that the residents are very friendly towards the Bolsheviks and hostile to the Ukrainians and Germans, especially after the annulment of the previous land law. There are many criminals and agitators in the county (www.starosti.com.ua/starosti/polozhenie-v-harkovshchine).

Having published such a quotation without context, the author-manipulator can draw any politically colored conclusions from it, but the uninformed reader with no knowledge of details can speculate about the given information even more.

**Be restrained in assessments.** The purpose of the journalistic text is not to impose the attitude towards the person, event or phenomenon (it is the task of propaganda) on the reader, but give him/her enough nutrition for reflection and formation of their own thoughts. Trying to saturate the text with emotional epithets almost always change its quality. The statement that deported Crimean Tatars were “carried out in inhumane, humiliating conditions that caused people great suffering” will not give the reader any idea or sense of how horrible these conditions were. Moreover, this very formulation can be used in another context — for example, describing passengers of Lviv minibuses. Provide specific conditions and allow the reader evaluate them. The same applies to moral and ethical assessments. Each reader has their own ethical standards: someone may respect the Ukrainian insurgents who in the late 1940s seemed to the Soviet government to be unreliable traitors, and someone would call their actions justifiable and reasonable. Your task
is to tell about who, when and under what conditions did it, giving enough information for self-reflection.

Objectivity in journalism is obviously unattainable: it is a philosophical category. Therefore, the statement that the journalist should always be objective is incorrect. When they say so, keep in mind that the author should be:

- **IMPARTIAL**, that is, describing a conflict and not supporting any of its sides. If there are different versions of what has happened, the author should present them and may give them a reasoned assessment without revealing which one he/she dislikes;

- **NOT INVOLVED**, that is, not benefitting from the events of one of the parties in the conflict and not being its participant. Should we consider a biased journalist whose work is paid by a foreign fund as the one who is promoting certain values (left, right, democratic, etc.)? At least, readers have the right to know about such connection;

- **NONJUDGMENTAL**, that is, to be able to distance himself from his own attitude to what he is investigating and not to make assumptions about what is still not clear. Impartiality is not indifference, but the readiness for the fact that reality does not fit into the matrix of author's perceptions and beliefs;

- **NEUTRAL**, that is, to choose words that do not program readers for a certain attitude to the described people, facts and events. This guidance contradicts the desire of many journalists to “state things as they are”. Such guidance can be satisfied in the format of the column. Neutrality is also important because appalling assessments can push people who have different perspectives on situations in your text. Name the Soviet troops in Ukraine
in 1944 as invaders, and part of the audience may not perceive your material further; call them the liberators and you might scare the rest. Allow these people lose the chance to change their minds by learning the facts.

**The tendency of selection of facts and evidence that are consistent with the author's hypothesis is unacceptable.** By constructing a reality this way, a journalist risks not only his personal reputation but also the audience's trust in the editorial staff of the media in which the material was published.

**Facts and comments must be presented separately.** Authors who work with oral or written memoirs of eyewitnesses of historical events often forget that this is only a subjective reflection in the memory of an individual. The fact that someone remembers certain times does not necessarily coincide with historical facts. Thus, there are texts about how humane the Nazi occupation regime was in comparison with the Soviet one. They are built on memories of “good German soldiers” who treated children to chocolate and paid for water from the well. These memories, of course, are important, but should be presented in the context and supplemented by facts.

**The author's “I”, that is, writing from the first person or introducing 'myself' into the text as a character, is appropriate in the case where the description of the actions of the author is not only important but necessary for understanding what is being said.** An example of it is when the author himself shares memories and the process of his creative searches and discoveries itself is part of history. In the absolute majority of cases, there is no need for this, and the author's misuse of “I” is simply a way to nourish his vanity.
One of the forms of inappropriate inclusion of the author in the text is writing about himself in a third person — “the author of these lines”, “your author,” and so on: 

As soon as the Correspondent gets into an unremarkable yellow building on Zolotvoritska-Street in Kyiv, the entrance to which for many years was closed for most Ukrainians, the deputy head of this institution Volodymyr Birchak warns with a smile: “You know, if something happens, the Security Services of Ukraine now have a file on you! It's still thin, but we will see it later” (https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3516417-arkhiv-smerti-sbu-povnistui-vidkryla-dokumenty-radianskykh-spetssluzhb).

This passage could be presented as follows: “You know, if anything, the SSU now has a file on you! It's still thin, and we will see it later,” says Volodymyr Birchak, the deputy head of the Archives of the Security Services of Ukraine, with a smile. The entrance to this yellow house at Zolotovoritska-Street in Kyiv for many years has been closed to most Ukrainians.

It is unacceptable in journalism to talk about you in plural — “we have analyzed”, “we have researched” etc., since it is the usual practice of post-Soviet (pseudo) science.

➤ **Differentiate the specifics of the genre.** Different forms of journalistic text can be used to tell a history based on archival documents.

➤ **Information** (news) genres might be needed when telling about your discovery.

➤ **The analytics** involves detailed analysis (“spreading out”) of the chosen problem and finding the answer to a question that is important or interesting to the audience. Correct analytics is based on many sources. It requires a well-balanced approach, taking into account different
arguments, in particular those with which you as the author do not agree.

**Publicism** (columnarism, essay writing) allows not only to tell the story, but to reflect on it, expressing the author’s own opinion while sharing associations and emotions with the reader. The fact is even a subjective opinion sounds convincing to a wide audience only when it is substantiated. The author explains why he believes this way.

The genre of **Artistic Reporting** is well suited for telling stories based on documentary evidence. Based on facts, the developed artistic reality fills the space between facts. The report provides stories from the past by living sound. The Polish reporter Mariusz Szczygieł in his books on the Czech Republic recreated a whole stratum of the history of the twentieth century through memoirs and archival documents.

In modern media the boundaries of genres are blurred. One can combine elements of different genres and even genre groups by constructing your text in a way that is best suited for your story. However, it is important that the material remains intact. A detailed detainment of the documentary evidence of repression followed by breaking up on the pathetic typing of the crimes of the Soviet regime would at least confuse the reader.
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Fakes, Disinformation and Propaganda: How the Archives can Overcome Them

Information performs one of the key roles in conflicts and wars and both opponents actively use it. In recent years, with the advent in hybrid wars, the information component is a defining one. Archival material can also be a weighty tool. It is important for journalists to understand how to use it in such a war and — most importantly — how it can help withstand such attacks.

Early on during the informational wars, opponents introduced censorship, the closure of borders or the confiscation of editions of newspapers and magazines. Today, when the internet has made access to information globally available, it is almost impossible to stop. It can even contradict the principle of liberal democracies.

One of the most recent of these examples is the hybrid war which has been conducted by Russia against Ukraine, which has not only imposed armed intervention or facilitated the creation and maintenance of illegally armed groups
on the territory of the temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but also conducts a war in informational space. Whether Ukraine receives assistance or whether sanctions are imposed against Russia are dependent on what the world knows about us.

Moreover, depending on the historical narrative which media disseminate and support, the event itself may receive completely opposite interpretations. An example would be the Euromaidan/Revolution of Dignity. From the Ukrainian side, it was interpreted as a protest of the youth supported by the historical reluctance of Ukraine to remain under the influence of Russia. Information efforts from Russia did and are doing everything to show these protestors as “fascists”, almost as if they were the heirs of National Socialism of the Second World War.

Sometimes the aggressor sufficiently confuses and misleads as many interested readers/listeners as possible, so that those who can help cannot make any decisions and hesitate as to the actual picture of those events or facts. Historical narratives using fake news, dissemination of disinformation and outright or veiled propaganda are tools of such information warfare.

**Historical narratives** are a phenomenon that has a fairly wide interpretation. The very term “narrative” implies a “story, tale”. Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle called the narrative a presentation of facts as the narrator wants in order for listeners to understand them. This is the art of persuasion with the help of historical arguments — with truth, close to the truth or outright fictitiousness. The bases of historical narratives are these facts and their interpretations. The narrative is the instrument, through which the
author interprets the past in the so-called secondary simulation system*.

**PROPAGANDA** is the deliberate, systematic attempt to form a perception of a phenomenon, manipulate knowledge and direct behaviour in order to achieve an intended result. It has a purposeful impact on individuals or social groups in order to attract supporters and allies to its side, to impose one's convictions on them and to set desirable behaviour patterns. The art of narrative is used in propaganda**.

**DISINFORMATION** is the introduction of erroneous thinking to the listener through the presentation of mis-taken or false (invented) information. This is the fabrication of data, tactics of disapproval (slander, lies) which are used to discredit the enemy. Creating and disseminating misleading information or the creation of false information is intended to harm the pattern of a country chosen as the target of such an informational attack. Disinformation differs from propaganda by the fact that it focuses on the negative, misleading and disappointing. This is a process of systematic actions***.

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**Fake news** or **fakes** is the submission of fake or half-truth news which create a misleading perception of reality for the listener/reader/viewer. The purpose of spreading fake news is to ignore the truth and construct a fictional reality. Fakes can work to change the picture of the world as a whole while undermining its foundations at its weakest source. This is a deliberate misinformation campaign on a social scale. Digital technologies and the internet make it easy to create and distribute fake news*

The use of these methods in a hybrid war gives tangible results, especially if there is already a certain group ready to accept or support a certain historical narrative in the society in which one is planning to carry out an informational attack. In post-communist countries, such environments include, above all, those who thirst for the communist past, believe its propaganda and live within the myths and stereotypes of “victory of the world revolution”.

Contemporary Russia does not only accentuate post-communist environments but also uses ultra-right and other radical environments. Post-communists place the “evil Western bourgeois” in the center of their narratives, which “throws chains around the working people and poorer societies.” Blameless people often see enemies in their neighbours, who allegedly inflicted some pain on his people in the past and now they must “rise up from their knees” and

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“show their strength to others.” Often, enemies can coincide: “bourgeois”, “oligarchs”, “America”, “liberals”. And everyone has their “own”, based on his ideology: “fascists”, “nationalists”, “leftists”, etc. The use of such different environments in Russia during their informational warfare reflects their divide et impera* strategy.

From the KGB archives, we learn of the constant attention paid by the Chekists to the relations of Ukrainians to the Poles and Jews. The communist secret services tried to prevent any cooperation between them. For this purpose, special informational operations were carried out which was to compromise and disperse all involved parties.

A striking example of this is the use of these methods in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Poland is an ally of Ukraine in the international arena and consistently supports Ukraine in its intentions of Euro-Atlantic and European integration. Russia is trying to maintain its sphere of influence over Ukraine and therefore, the union or simply the rapprochement of Ukraine to Poland and the Western world is considered a threat to its interests.

Over the past three years, the most controversial issues and contradictions in Polish-Ukrainian relations have emerged in the historical policies of both countries. History is far from last place in the political discourse of Poland and Ukraine. Russia is trying to use this in their own way — by promoting its historical narratives, which deepen the Polish-Ukrainian controversy. All these narrative find support in various environments of Ukraine and Poland.

* From the Latin to “divide and conquer”.

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By using methods of propaganda, disinformation and fake news, Russia is trying to radicalize the Polish-Ukrainian discussions around history and consolidate (spread) these antagonistic themes in the media space of both countries. These are not necessarily narratives that concern the Polish-Ukrainian conflicts of the past but also those that deepen the negative attitude of the two neighbouring countries to each other.

One of the historical narratives which Russia actively disseminates for its propaganda purposes is that “the Poles began the Second World War alongside Nazi Germany.” The main theses of this narrative are as follows:

➢ The Poles are responsible for the beginning of the war because they collaborated with the Nazis and participated in the division of Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938; it was Poland, and not the Soviet Union, which was co-responsible with Nazi Germany for the start of the Second World War;

➢ Poland worked closely with the German government until 1939 and planned to seize the territory of Soviet Ukraine and Belarus in order to get access to the Black Sea.

The text which features the accusation that Poland began the Second World War was posted on the website of the Russian Ministry of Defence in 2009*. Although it was removed from the ministry website after criticism from historians, it can be found on other Russian electronic resources**.

Fakes, Disinformation and Propaganda

In 2017, after the statements by the Polish Foreign Minister, Witold Waszczykowski, on the joint responsibility of the Soviet Union for the German invasion of Poland and the beginning of the Second World War, the aforementioned narrative gained popularity as is seen in the publication “How Poland was an Ally of Hitler”:

“It is Poland that, along with Germany and its other allies, carries the most direct blame for the outbreak of the Second World War, which, by the way, did not actually begin with an attack on Poland but with the division of Czechoslovakia and the destruction of an independent Czechoslovak state. This division took place with the support of the West and the direct participation of Poland”*. 

This narrative is also spread in Ukrainian media — as an attempt to counterbalance the Polish narratives about the cooperation of the OUN with Nazi Germany and the equalization of Ukrainian nationalism with the Nazi and Soviet regimes. For example, in the publication: “Poland: Forgotten Allies of the Third Reich”:

“How Poland helped Hitler. The history of the Second World War today is accepted as an interpretation of a black and white concept: evil Hitler attacked innocent Poland. But there are many inconvenient facts within this concept which include a joint crime of the two aggressors less than a year before the Second World War. This history of the initial stage of the war, if it is transferred to a domestic level, is more like the friendship of two thieves, who rob an apartment together. And

they later quarrel and one kills the other. Similarly, the same occurred between Poland and Germany in 1938–1939, and later between the Reich and the USSR”*.

An example of the propaganda using this same narrative can be seen in the text from the Russian internet resource politikus.ru: “How Poland unleashed the Second World War”. One of the messages of this Russian propaganda can be read in the text using a historical narrative on the “bad and treacherous Poland and friendly and peaceful Russia in its relations with Ukraine”: “History teaches us, exactly how glorious the Poles are. Primarily, one must not enter into any close ties with them — do we need a crazy person working in a gunpowder factory?”** After such a text, the reader forms a mistrust towards Poland and the Western world in general, and believe that only Russia is a reliable ally for Ukraine.

The distribution of disinformation occurs with the use of false or half-truth material. For example, to convince a reader that Poland began the Second World War together with Germany and was its reliable ally for years, Russian media spread an authentic photograph of Józef Piłsudski’s symbolic funeral in Berlin with Adolf Hitler present but with the description being “Adolf Hitler during the funeral of Piłsudski in Warsaw. 1935”***.

The description and photograph strengthen the reader’s belief of the friendly relations between the Nazis and the

*** http://rusplt.ru/fact/polsha-i-reyh.html
Poles in the interwar period, as well as the Second World War being a direct consequence of such relations.

The picture of Piłsudski’s symbolic funeral also appeared in the Ukrainian media with the following fictional description: “Here the Poles forbade the Banderites in communicating with Hitler...Here is a photo of Hitler at the funeral of his close friend Bandera...Oh, no...Bandera was then sitting in a German concentration camp! And this is the hero of Poland, the father of the nation and such things — Piłsudski’s coffin”. (By the way, Stepan Bandera was not in any German concentration camp in 1934. In June 1934 he was arrested by the Polish police and detained in a Lviv prison, then was moved to Krakow and Warsaw.)

Also there is this example of fake information in an article on the site zrada.org, which begins with a reference to a visit of the Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski’s to Lviv in November 2017, who talks about the “friendship of Hitler and Pilsudski”. The article supposedly uses Hitler’s words: “If Piłsudski was alive — there would be no war”. This fake quote is used to convince the reader that if Piłsudski lived than Nazi Germany would not begin a fight with Poland and would be her ally in the war and seize Ukrainian and Belarussian land. This fake has been actively disseminated in the Russian social networks since 2013.

One can also disassemble the antagonistic historical narratives of both countries and societies which is distrib-

uted and spurred on by Russia, using various methods of informational warfare, and by using the KGB archives. It is false that the archives are only for historians. The spread of historical narratives through the media testifies that archival materials are no less useful for journalists as for historians. First, one should clearly learn to distinguish between propaganda, disinformation and fake news:

1. **Propaganda** is the systematic repetition of one narrative in different forms, sometimes with different names, but with a common thesis. These theses are backed up by quotations taken out of context. The description of the events is always non-negotiable and fully corresponds with ideological or political goals. Information is not balanced and is submitted only selectively.

Often, in order to explain an event, a collective image of experts is used, as for example: “German historians”, “Polish researchers”. According to these outlines, there are no specific individuals whose information can be verified.

For the listener/reader/viewer, such a collective image should inspire belief in the correctness of the assertions and truthfulness of the information provided. It is worth remembering that propaganda often happens in different ways: “white”, “gray” and “black.” The easiest to identify is “white” propaganda as the source of its distribution is not hidden. The other two types — “grey” and “black” — use either third parties (“black propaganda”) or independent or specially created sources when disseminating information.

Propaganda is not only used to form a negative image of a person, but it can also be used to create its own positive image.
2. **Disinformation** mainly focuses on the negative. Information is presented in such a way as to cause a strong emotional sensation in the listener or reader which leads to erroneous conclusions.

Much false or distorted information has no references or referrals to its source. Instead of facts, comments are submitted which the listener/reader perceives as facts. If, however, quotations are submitted and an author is sources, then the information on where or when these words were spoken is not provided.

Disinformation is often distributed through social media. For the most part, it is short texts with the description to “spread urgently”, “shocking”, “this has never been seen before.” Such words attract the attention and immediately adjust the reader/listener’s emotional perceptions.

3. **Fakes** and **Fake news** differ from disinformation in that they are immediate false, fictitious information whereas disinformation manipulates the facts and data on what actually happened, representing them in a different context or manipulating one for the other.

Disinformation is always created with a specific purpose, but fake news may appear as a result of the carelessness of the author/journalist. If a fake is created purposefully, then it performs the same role as disinformation. True, the concentration on the negative is not its main feature. Purposefully created fake news confuses the reader/viewer/listener and does not allow them to know if the news is true or not.

Typically, fakes — especially photo-fakes, can be easily verified by searching the internet: for example, by checking on a photo by using the search “Find this image on Google” or using TinEye ([www.tineye.com](http://www.tineye.com)).
Media materials that also relate/touch upon historical issues are also very vulnerable to toxic content — propaganda, disinformation and fakes. The dynamism of information flows, the lack of time to fact-check, the lack of proper knowledge about where and how it is possible to check the authenticity of these facts and the adequacy of expert opinions also contribute to this.

While working on messages, releases and other media publications that are tangent to historical issues, a journalist should first evaluate their sources to detect the presence of toxic content.

They should primarily pay attention to:

- language and terms — whether there is any ideological, subjective taint;
- distributor of information — who distributes, promotes and comments on the material;
- source of information — where exactly were these facts mentioned for the first time and their origin.

It is worth paying close attention to the use of “language of hatred” and the emotional tone of the material. As a rule, the more emotionally descriptive the material, the greater the likelihood that it will contain toxic material. At the same time, it should be remembered that this does not apply to the direct testimonies of eyewitnesses or quotes from archival documents.

Ways of disseminating information, especially through social media, helps in understanding whether there is a deliberate advancement of a particular narrative, and if so — by whom. Here it is important to find the source: who was the first to publish the data; to what extent this person or
media relates to history, or whether this person, organization or institution is even real.

The most important part of working with medial materials on historical topics is **CHECKING THEIR AUTHENTICITY**: did the described events really take place (or did eyewitnesses write about them), the source of their origin can be checked, they are presented to the fullness (as possible in the media). It is in this crucial point of working with historical materials that archives are critically important. As a rule, historical conclusions, hypotheses, assumption or (re)constructions are created using archival information.

Before using any historical data in your material, it is necessary to determine where the originals of your evidence are stored, to check that they are correctly used by historians and experts, or whether a selective approach is applied and whether or not these events have even taken place at all. A good rule of thumb is to reference the archival storage place of the cited testimony. If the citation on the information is missing — this should be a red-flag. In this case, it is definitely worth searching for a verification of the source of information.

Today, many digital archives and full-text repositories exist online, which can help in checking the authenticity of statements, topics and narratives. If the material you are preparing concerns sensitive, tricky or acute questions, it is best not to be lazy and go to the archives directly in order to personally make sure you do not fall prey to propaganda, disinformation or fake news.

The verification of archival sources referenced by media materials is also important because historians and archival
workers are constantly finding new evidence which uncovers another perspective of a certain event. In order not to repeat the narratives that have already been denied by scholars, it is not worth working with information which seems to contradict historical knowledge provided in textbooks or on “Wikipedia”. However, one also needs to carefully check what the researchers’ sources are and if they are really new.

Having mastered the methods of conducting information warfare, a journalist will be able to better understand historical narratives. And by using open archives, one can not only help identify examples of propaganda, fakes or disinformation in historical narratives, but also create new ones that are built upon true sources.
instead of the afterword
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WHERE THE DEVIL IS HIDING

About Journalistic Standards in the Post-Truth Era

At the very beginning, any, literally any, new media project in Ukraine (and I was involved as a participant or an observer with several of them) declares that it is to be guided in its policies by the BBC Editorial Guidelines. This 215-page document is considered a “sacred cow” of modern journalism. It is mandatory for all employees and services of the British Broadcasting Corporation and is the unsurpassed model for professional journalists all around the world. Even those who have never looked inside it know that it is imperative for journalist to uphold the objectivity and impartiality, as well as the equal representation of all points of view in a conflict (as any news by definition is a veiled or obvious manifestation of a conflict, unless it is a clearly natural disaster like the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland).

Some seasoned members of the professional community, in addition to objectivity, have heard of such basic field standards as reliability, accuracy, efficiency, and separation of facts from personal biases. But this convention is not always considered obligatory to follow, otherwise we would not have seen yesterday’s news absent fact-checking, and
we would not have seen headlines replete with judgments like “a scandalous oligarch” and “an odious politician” — the archetype of outrageous violations of principles, even in the case of a certified scoundrel.

Actually, in my opinion, the demonstrative neglect of standards in contemporary Ukraine is not as dangerous (because it is obvious and is quickly recognized under scrutiny) as a verbatim application of badly assimilated rules. Primarily, this concerns “objectivity” and “impartiality”. These concepts harbor the epistemological trap, but more on it later, meanwhile, let’s consider such an attractive outward pose — although why is it “a pose”? For someone, it is organic, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world.

American textbooks mention the legendary journalist of the last century Walter Cronkite, a longtime anchor of the CBS evening news. Opinion polls consistently named him “the man Americans trust most.” Over the span of his career, he regularly hosted television debates of presidential nominees: Eisenhower vs Stephenson, Kennedy vs Nixon, Johnson vs Goldwater, Nixon vs Humphrey, Nixon again vs McGovern, Carter vs Ford, Reagan vs Carter... And no one ever, including the participants in the debates, knew whose side the moderator was on. Only having finished his career, Cronkite admitted in an interview that he always sympathized with the Republican Party. However, this example is cited in the United States nowadays as a charming fable against the backdrop of the CNN predictably backing the Democrats, while Fox News openly supporting the Republicans.

Igor Pomerantsev, a well-known Russian-British journalist and poet, recalls the torments he faced when in 1980,
with some journalistic experience already under his belt, he joined the BBC Russian Service. Throughout his first year, British producers regularly rejected his materials with the only remark: “This is not BBC!” Not BBC, because it was too personal, too emotional, too categorical ... Judging by the fact that he was not fired and was much endured, his newcomer’s experience was not unique to the Corporation. What is and what isn’t BBC is determined by a strict protocol (the already mentioned BBC Editorial Guidelines), nevertheless, the subjective opinion of experienced editors is decisive, and it is described by another useful common expression involving ‘a stiff upper lip’. Recall Daniel Craig’s James Bond and you will get the image: a steel look, a minimum of emotions, and a willingness to cut throats ... no, not for Her Majesty’s sake, but for the interests of the society that the Corporation embodies.

But one should not demonize the oldest and most respected broadcaster in the world: it produces an incredible quantity and variety of programs, including entertainment ones, and its news is consistently accurate, interesting, vibrant, and peppered with remarkably restrained British humor. Straightforward requirements for quality information intersected with, firstly, cultural traditions and, secondly, the privileges of good living. Standing on a “three-hundred-year-old lawn” in the middle of the island, it's not so difficult to feel above the fray.

The issue of objectivity has become particularly acute in recent times when post-truth prevails worldwide, and Europe, in the case of Ukraine, faces a hybrid-warfare type aggression from Russia. Not only an average viewer/listener/reader but also the bureaucrat in charge lacks reliable
data for strategic decision-making. When the BBC’s CEO Tony Hall claims that the “Big Four” or GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) have “created hyperinflation” in the global content market, the state of affairs is certainly appalling. Most of all, there is the surplus of information supply, “white noise”, which is difficult to discern and where valuable data are hard to discriminate, separating them from divergence, propaganda, fakes, and simply junk.

The problem was highlighted over half a century ago when Walter Sullivan, a well-known American journalist and a science reporter, used the catchphrase the “information explosion” in his *The New York Times* column. Even before personal computers, the internet, blogs, and social networks, he noted the tendency that global information increases exponentially: each year it swelled by 30%. Assuming that 30 years ago the information volume in all countries, on all carriers was estimated at about 6.3 exabytes (1 exabyte = 1018 bytes), presently it has just exceeded 1,000 exabytes. To illustrate the point (recognizing a certain simplification of a rather complicated process): a standard one-page text on an A4 sheet contains four kilobytes of data, and an average person lacking speed-reading skills, without resting and sleeping, can read and learn about one megabyte of printed content per day.

Overproduction and hyperinflation of the content result in the situation where only those who are crying out the loudest and dumbing down the most, while deliberately ignoring facts and rational arguments, are being heard. This very media landscape is hence called “post-truth”. Thus, Donald Trump shouted over the CNN; thus, a notorious RT [Russia Today] television channel has almost got estab-
lished in the US media market; thus, some two hundred not-so-bright guys and jills from a psychological operation outfit owned by a former Putin’s cook, managed to interfere in the 2016 US general election. Therefore, before journalists step up to a _symbolic_ bully pulpit to share news, an observation, or an opinion, they have to assume the utmost responsibility, because among all this mishmash the quality of their statements, that is their efficiency and relevance, is their only advantage and the assurance of credibility.

Meanwhile, the current practice demonstrates the opposite. Reporters, editors, producers, columnists often employ self-censorship to avoid accusations of bias (or, at worst, mask their bias) by distancing themselves as far as possible from the subject of their attention and giving voice to both sides of a conflict equally. This is noticeable in countries with established press traditions, and the same is happening in Ukraine, in spite of their absence.

The principle of _audiatur et altera pars (listen to the other side as well)_ comes from the legal culture of antiquity, which laid the foundations of due process in the court of law. From there it moved on to the field of rhetoric and thus determined the way of thinking for the entire European civilization. However, beyond clear rules and regulations, the equality requirement for different points of view regardless of their origin, the integrity of their holders, and the possibility of verification become its perversion rather than a guarantee of a deeper and more comprehensive consideration of a problem.

Imagine an epidemiological congress where, on the one hand, scientists and clinicians report on new vaccines and epizootic outbreaks and, on the other, sorcerers and authori-
ties on witchcraft talk about ways of fending off witches that cast illnesses and poison wells. Or even better, envision an astrophysical debate between representatives of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, responsible for the Mars flight trajectory, and scholars on the Book of Ezekiel, a Hebrew Prophet of the Old Testament. Roughly, that is how bad press’ coverage of controversial events in various regions often looks like, and especially the reports of the Kremlin mouthpieces on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

When fairly authoritative Western media publish materials about a “civil war” in Eastern Ukraine and a threat of Nazism that allegedly provoked it, we are witnessing a clear demonstration of the method of non-interference, an abstention from naming the actual perpetrators of the calamity or shaming the criminals at large. When Ukrainian TV channels and other information outlets invite speakers calling for peace at all cost, we are dealing with “sorcerers”, or more precisely, with conscientious swindlers and provocateurs who masquerade themselves as *Mindreaders*, akin to the 1979 eponymous American TV game show.

The “above the fray” tactic is characteristic not only of the mass media but, unfortunately, it is intrinsic to the entire establishment of the “First World”. Yulia Latynina, a now-exiled Russian journalist once lampooned the infamous OSCE commission report on the 2008 Russian-Georgian war authored by a Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini: “If you believe the Georgians, it’s the Russians who started the war, and if you trust the Russians, then it’s the Georgians. And who is in the right, we do not know”. Latynina offers a lucid analogy: “the Germans claimed that Poland started
the WWII, and the Poles declared that it was Germany, but the truth ought to be somewhere in the middle”. She ends with a piercing formulation: “It is Hitler's word against the word of a Jew from Auschwitz, the balance is struck!”

To abstain from the sacred duty of an intellectual to seek truth, to call a spade a spade, or as the French say: “appeler un chat, un chat (to call a cat a cat)” — is a distinctive feature of the modern leftist discourse of “political correctness”, for which there is a considerable temptation to suspect not only immaturity but also an explicit mercantile interest, as it is well-known that Moscow amply supports materially a good deal of Western officials and public intellectuals. Unfortunately, this assumption simplifies the picture way too much.

Considerable responsibility for the fragility of self-determination of the press over the past decades lies with the dominant traditions of postmodernism, fashioned by French philosophers brought up by the Parisian barricades of 1968. In this discourse, the very concept of “reality” is subject to the unconditional ban, and the world is described by a random number of completely equal expressions. Independence from facts, the indefinite relativity consequently leads not only to the cultural relativism but also to the ethical one, the substitute for which in the world of leftist ideas is sought in the fight against various kinds of discrimination. Thus, the journalistic standpoint of exemplary non-interference, refraining from conclusions fully corresponds to the prevailing academic tendency.

Fortunately, in the world of theory, there are other ways to describe the phenomena we are examining, and in the
world of practice, there are other commonly accepted patterns of dealing with facts and delivering them to the general public. Untarnished authors and quite respectable media still do exist, including the latest crop. Among them, yesterday's private blogs such as Politico, Huffington Post, BuzzFeed, and others. An interesting point: having turned into more powerful information ventures, they have substantially upgraded their toolkit and now give high priority to ensuring the reliability of information. Therefore, the rules of integrity are universal.

Let's take a closer look at a standard message of a news agency, one of the hundreds of millions: “Paris, May 12, 2018 (Reuters) — An assailant shouting “Allahu akbar” killed a passer-by in a knife attack that also wounded four others in the heart of Paris late on Saturday before he was shot dead by police, French authorities said.” Here everything corresponds to the basic rules taught in the first classes of the school of journalism — the answers to the mandatory questions are given: who, what, when, where, why, in what way (the “Quintilian principle” formulated in Ancient Rome as part of the then obligatory discipline of rhetoric, the art of thought expression). But if you pay closer attention to the text, it raises an additional question: whom am I dealing with? Who articulates this? Reuters? What or who is Reuters? Okay, I am aware that Reuters is an information agency founded in 1851 that does carefully scrutinize all the facts before they are made public and retains people who can be relied upon. Hence, this message is neither the voice of God who speaks from heaven nor it is an inscription on sacred tablets but a specially trained reporter who, even
remaining anonymous, was on the scene in person, talked to the police, the eyewitnesses, the paramedics and expeditiously published the collected data. Then, I do have faith. But if I were told the very same news by a next-door neighbor, I would probably have treated it a bit differently.

In fact, it was on this very occasion that Michael Polanyi, a Hungarian-born British-American biologist and philosopher of science, remarked that any form of knowledge, even purely factual, contains a personal statement, a hidden value judgment. For example, if a textbook postulates that the Earth revolves around the Sun, then these words contain not just this fact, but the textbook’s author personal attitude towards it: “I am convinced that this is exactly the case” and “I deem it necessary to inform you of it,” and so on. To say that “something is true” means signing a certain obligation or declaring one’s consent, thus, introducing an element of responsibility for its content.

From the common-sense point of view, such a perspective is a seemingly obvious one but an inexperienced consumer, especially of the older generation, raised in the environment of state monopoly on truth, without hesitation, trusts news reported in “a newspaper” or “on TV”, and with the dedication of sancta simplicitas disseminates it further on as one’s own. This is exactly what the “viral” news of a subversive nature, which Kremlin propaganda generously supplies to Ukraine, counts on. But even the younger generation [of Ukrainians] are buying it, only gaining their trust requires additional legitimization. Volunteer analysts from the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center and the Maidan Monitoring Information Center, in particular, regularly track chains
of hybrid news up to their source. Usually, such news is launched at the same time by bots from many social networks addresses with minimal variations in expectation until it is reposted by someone real with the least significant status on the network. Then, it can be reprinted in marginal online publications with an existing link, and it is further possible that they will be picked up by leading outlets, determining to one degree or another the political climate in a society on a given day.

Summing up the preliminary result: “objectivity” in journalism is, on the one hand, a culturally-specific myth, on the other — it is an imitation of adherence of all the verification procedures. In the end, no reporter or editor can distance oneself from one’s personal experience, tradition, mental frame while introducing a new text into the existing narrative prevailing in the relevant community. The crafting of a particular message, the choice of its components, the order of their presentation, even the particular terms used paint the text one way or another in certain subjective tones. The same applies beyond strictly verbal information. A photographer frames the picture, a film editor selects a minute-long cut out of several hours of footage. Again, a news editor or a news producer sets up the agenda for a certain date — or simply makes it up based on editorial objectives and one’s own hierarchy of values.

The strive for objectivity could be a manifestation of individual professional perfectionism, a desire to convey a phenomenon in all its contradictions (is Ukraine's position in the military conflict so impeccable, or aren't we demonizing our fellow citizens who stick to different convictions?) but
more often than not it is only a posture in order to warrant audience confidence. And this, unfortunately, is the reality of a hybrid warfare.

It's time to return to the document with which we started our “flight data analysis” and which, according to my observations, a lot of my colleagues referring to have never seen at all. After all, it begins with the following: “In a perfect world, the BBC Editorial Guidelines would consist of one sentence: use your own best judgment. No set of rules or guidelines can ever replace the need for producers, editors and managers to use the wisdom that comes from experience, common sense and a clear set of editorial and ethical values when confronted with difficult editorial challenges” (emphasis is mine — YM).

Every word here is worth its weight in gold. It turns out that the usual procedures, algorithms, and protocols are valuable not by themselves, but only as a means of ensuring maximum integrity, avoiding manipulations, and potentially harming individuals and society as a whole, an instrumental manifestation of ethics that a society shares in solidarity.

In the end, protocols are the result not only of the accumulated collective knowledge but also of the mutually acceptable arrangements on both sides of the barricade. Half a century ago a phenomenon called “new journalism” or “gonzo-journalism” came into being. Its representatives: Tom Wolfe, Truman Capote, Hunter Thompson, Norman Mailer, and others brought a story of the author (or an implicit author) to the forefront, did not shy away from artistic visions, shared their personal impressions, thus personifying their
texts as much as possible. This was partly a response to the dread of the prevailing style, which has outgrown its functional framework, partly an attempt to increase the legitimacy of the message and its credibility, to introduce details and nuances that are fundamental to understanding the phenomenon but remain hidden behind the scenes of conventional methods of presentation.

The crucial point was: no rules can replace an author's personal responsibility. The author must have experience and conscience, be sure regarding what did happen and how, carefully gather all the details, check and recheck the names and facts, consult all the relevant authorities, be skeptical, refrain from wishful thinking, not be gullible, and write up it all down in a simple and accessible manner as quickly as possible. Only then shall I add a piece of his or her vision into my world’s puzzle.

The information explosion put forth one more task before a journalist: to be a filter, a firewall in front of an avalanche of chaos that just passes for orderly information supposedly loaded with meaning. An author — or a collective author under the auspices of a trusted brand — is the best, most reliable defender against social entropy and purposeful sabotage. Alexander Genis, a Russian-American writer, frames this job by describing his relationship with his favorite daily *The New York Times*: “Having lost to the Internet, the newspaper became wiser and now it is not so much sharing information as protecting the reader from it, selecting and revealing the most important things.”

The final product is a certainty, the elimination of entropy, as Claude Shannon, a father of the information theory in-
structured. The game of relativity, the information relativism (“let’s listen to both sides and refrain from conclusions”) — is not only an admission of helplessness but also a moral compromise, a capitulation to the devil. Truth is always one and the same. It can be complicated (in fact, it cannot be uncomplicated), but one’s job is to figure it out. And finally. A famous Jewish writer, a Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel once noted: “We must take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented."

The described dilemma concerns, of course, not just current information. Any journalism, counting opinion journalism as well, devoted to social problems, history included, is a subject to the same laws. It operates within the same concepts: facts, actors, given circumstances, the final content, a moral takeaway. It has the same result — reducing chaos, uncertainty, narrowing the devil’s territory.
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